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1.1 CENTRAL ISSUES AND FRAMING OF THE DISCUSSION 
Cannabis use and possession is prohibited by the overwhelming majority of states1  
and South Africa is no different. However, recently some states have decriminalised the use 
and possession of cannabis or have fully legalised its use and possession. It is necessary here 
to explain the difference between decriminalisation and legalisation. Decriminalisation is a 
process where the use and possession of cannabis is, subject to certain conditions and 
regulations, removed from the legislation of the relevant state as an offence, and it is 
therefore permissible to possess and consume small quantities of the plant (or at least some 
of its constituent parts). Typically, a state which has decriminalised the use and possession 
of cannabis will allow private adult individuals to use and possess small amounts of the plant 
without being subject to the threat of prosecution, but still prohibits the trafficking and 
commercial sale of cannabis.  
In certain instances (for example for medical use) cannabis may be traded under 
medical exemption, but the position under this type of regime is still that, although cannabis 
may be possessed and used (subject to conditions) without the possibility of criminal 
sanction, its commercial cultivation and sale are still prohibited by law. Legalisation, by 
contrast, implies that cannabis use, possession or commercial sale is no longer prohibited by 
law, and rather the substance occupies the same status as substances like alcohol and 
tobacco, such status being that use, possession, commercial cultivation and distribution of 
the substance is permissible under law but nonetheless may be subject to government 
regulation.  
In South Africa the use and possession of cannabis is neither decriminalised nor fully 
legalised. The case of Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 
(CCT36/00) [2002] ZACC 1; 2002 (2) SA 794; 2002 (3) BCLR 231 (CC) (‘Prince’) sets out the 
                                                          
1 New Health Guide ‘Where is Marijuana Legal?’ 2014 accessed from: 
http://www.newhealthguide.org/Where-Is-Marijuana-Legal.html accessed on: 2015-12-14. See table produced 
at the end of Chapter 5. 
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legislative framework which prohibits the possession, use and distribution of cannabis in 
South Africa, as follows: 
‘Cannabis is listed in Part III of Schedule 2 to the Drugs Act as an undesirable 
dependence-producing substance. Its use or possession is prohibited by section 4(b)… 
The stated purpose of the Drugs Act is to prohibit the use or possession of 
dependence-producing substances and dealing in such substances… Possession for 
medicinal purposes is exempted under section 4(b) but this exemption is subject to 
the provisions of the Medicines Act… Section 22A (10) of the Medicines Act read with 
Schedule 8 of that Act, also prohibits the use or possession of cannabis except for 
research or analytical purposes… Its stated purpose is to regulate the registration of 
medicines and substances… The substances listed in Schedule 8 of the Medicines Act 
are substantially the same as those listed in Part III of Schedule 2 to the Drugs Act…’2 
Briefly stated, the purpose for the prohibitions, per Prince: 
‘…are aimed at prohibiting the use of harmful dependence-producing drugs. 
Cannabis is the target of both statutes, primarily because it has the potential to 
cause harm in the form of psychological dependence when consumed regularly and 
in large doses.’3 
The enforcement of these two statutes’ prohibition on use or possession of cannabis 
is provided by section 40(h) of the Criminal Procedure Act4 insofar as it relates to the arrests 
for possession, consumption and transportation of cannabis for personal use, as well as 
arrests for possession, consumption and transportation of cannabis for profit or otherwise. 
Any potential challenge to the prohibition of cannabis therefore, would ultimately amount 
to a challenge to the relevant provisions of the Drug and Drug Trafficking Act and the 
Medicines and Related Substances Act, read with the enforcement provisions in the Criminal 
procedure Act. 
                                                          
2 Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope (CCT36/00) [2002] ZACC 1; 2002 (2) SA 794; 
2002 (3) BCLR 231 (CC) at paras 22-25. 
3 Supra at para 24. 
4 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
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It is therefore apparent that the relevant provisions in these two statutes form the 
essential basis for the illegal status of cannabis in South Africa, subject to certain very 
specific exemptions for medical research purposes. The medical exemptions, or indeed any 
current exemptions regarding the use or possession of cannabis, are beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. Instead, the purpose of this dissertation is to investigate whether a 
successful constitutional challenge could be formulated to completely remove the 
prohibition of cannabis in South Africa (as it relates to personal use and consumption of 
cannabis), rather than merely to obtain an exemption for whatever purpose. The reasoning 
to this end is discussed further in this work, under the chapter addressing the findings in 
Prince. 
To effect the decriminalization of cannabis therefore, a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the legislative scheme read as a whole (insofar as it relates to cannabis) 
would be necessary. The purpose of this dissertation then, is to investigate what the 
prospects of success of a challenge to the constitutionality of the legislative scheme would 
be if the matter were brought before a court with the necessary jurisdiction to decide the 
issue. The question of whether it is time to revisit the Prince case can therefore be 
addressed by investigating the prospects of success of a challenge to the constitutionality of 
the legislative framework.  
The central argument is that the relevant provisions of the Bill of Rights 
require/mandate the decriminalization of cannabis in South Africa. The only ground on 
which a successful challenge to the prohibition of cannabis may be sustained is if the 
legislative scheme which governs the prohibition is held to be unconstitutional and 
therefore invalid. For a declaration of invalidity per section 172 of the Constitution5, it 
would need to be proved on a balance of probabilities that a legislative scheme infringes 
upon rights in the Bill of Rights.  
 
 
                                                          
5 Constitution of the republic of South Africa, 1996 s172(1) and (2). 
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1.2 INIMICAL BEGINNINGS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF CANNABIS PROHIBITION IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
If one is to trace the history in Africa of the use and cultivation of cannabis, it 
becomes obvious that despite certain disagreements as to origin and proliferation of the 
cultivation and use of the plant, cannabis has been widely used and cultivated for centuries 
within South Africa, much like alcohol and tobacco. It is frequently (incorrectly) contended 
that the Khoikhoi were the ‘main cultivators of the plant in southern Africa’.6 Paterson 
instead propounds the view that ‘cannabis almost certainly entered Africa through Arab 
trading circles…The diffusion of cannabis throughout Africa came in two distinct phases’.7   
The disputed origin of cannabis cultivation in Southern Africa aside, it is nonetheless 
clear on a reading of Paterson’s research that whatever the origin of cannabis cultivation, it 
nevertheless found a place in the indigenous societies living in Southern Africa around the 
time of the first colonial presence in the region. Whether cultivation generated any cultural 
significance seems as likely to be disputed as the origins of cannabis cultivation seem to be, 
however Paterson’s comments regarding the history of cannabis smoking within the 
indigenous communities seem to suggest that at the very least, the smoking of the plant did 
come to achieve some culturally significant place in the customs of the indigenous 
communities.8  It is thus clear that cannabis smoking, and cannabis cultivation (as a 
necessary antecedent to smoking) both found some significance in the indigenous cultural 
life of their pre-colonial societies.  
The colonial powers did not take any moral exception to the trading of intoxicating 
substances until the second half of the 1800s under British rule, although Paterson notes 
that by this stage ‘the trade of opium averaged 15% of total revenues for British India’.9  The 
                                                          
6 C Paterson Prohibition & Resistance: A Socio-Political Exploration of the Changing Dynamics of the Southern 
African Cannabis Trade, c. 1850 – the present (A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts in History) 2009 Rhodes University at p20-24. See Paterson’s full thesis for a detailed analysis of 
the suggested origins of cannabis in Southern Africa.  
7 Ibid at p 21-22  
8 Ibid. Paterson discusses the potential cultural significance of cannabis at pp26-31 
9 Ibid at p32: ‘Prior to this time, the sale of drugs was seen by the colonial powers as a purely commercial 
exercise’.                
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Dutch colonial period saw trade of cannabis between the VOC and the Khoi-Khoi as not only 
being increasingly less worthwhile financially for the VOC than that of alcohol and tobacco 
but effectively damaging for the colonists financially. This damage was attributed to the 
effect of Khoi-Khoi cultivation of cannabis on the VOC’s much prized tobacco monopoly, 
such effect facilitated by cannabis replacing tobacco as the smoking product of choice 
among the Khoi people, after the Dutch prohibited the independent cultivation of tobacco 
by the Khoi.10 Despite this damage to the Dutch tobacco trade, cannabis continued to be 
traded between indigenous people and the colonists. Paterson summarises the colonists’ 
subsequent shift in attitude toward cannabis as follows:  
… [Cannabis] was not considered of particular value to settlers and was simply grown 
for labourers…the settlers were willing to use cannabis for this purpose – that is, that 
cannabis was considered as a legitimate commodity in trade. However, this attitude 
began to change in the early decades of the 19th century, as one begins to find 
references to the settler’s cultivation of cannabis being rendered with disdain…’ 11 
The second half of the 18th century and the early part of the 19th century saw the 
colonial attitudes towards cannabis shifting ever more toward the negative, and much of 
this shift in thinking can be attributed to the prevailing anthropological and psychological 
views of the colonial powers of period.12 Summarised, the prevailing view was that many 
characteristics found to be present in the subjects of criminology studies were identical to 
characteristics of the ‘savage’ native population, as viewed by the European psychological 
and criminological authorities of the time.13 Proximity to, and integration with, the ‘savage’ 
indigenous population by the European settlers was feared to affect the so-called morality 
of the settlers. The studies of the time linked integration to adoption by the settlers, of 
                                                          
10 C Paterson Prohibition & Resistance: A Socio-Political Exploration of the Changing Dynamics of the Southern 
African Cannabis Trade, c. 1850 – the present (A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts in History) 2009 Rhodes University. 
11 Ibid at p34. 
12 Ibid at pp33-39. For further particulars of the prevailing psychiatric and criminology research of the time, see 
also, M Chanock, The Making of South African Legal Culture, 1902-1936: Fear, Favour and Prejudice 2001 
Cambridge;, C. J. G Bourhill, The Smoking of Dagga (Indian Hemp) among the Native Races of South Africa, and 
the Resultant Evils (PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh) 1912 cited in Paterson above. 
13 Ibid at pp37-39. 
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those characteristics of the indigenous people, which were then (incorrectly) viewed as 
synonymous with criminal attributes.14  Paterson illustrates that the adoption of these 
characteristics was thought to directly stem from social interaction between the settlers and 
the indigenous population: 
‘The overlap between psychology and criminology at the time (and the corresponding 
fields of psychiatry and penology) resulted in the acceptance of a specific 
psychological type associated with criminality. Moreover, the instantiation of this 
psychological type was seen as being dependent on social experience. According to 
this view…the psychology of a person may change, and this change occurs through 
their social interactions…The use of the asylum system to control ‘undesirables’ in the 
colonies can be seen in the case of British India, and it also marks a major point in the 
process of cannabis prohibition. It was through the Indian asylum system that the 
connection between cannabis use and insanity was first brought into colonial 
politics.’15 
It becomes apparent then, that the politicization of the use and trade of cannabis, 
and the prohibitionist attitude toward it can be directly linked to the racialized psychological 
attitudes of the time. The connection between the racialized psychological views and the 
criminology of the period created the view that the indigenous people were by nature more 
predisposed to exhibit criminal characteristics, owing to the already-present similarity 
between their perceived characteristics and those of criminals. Moreover, these 
characteristics were capable of being absorbed by those who originally did not possess them 
(the European settlers) through sustained interaction with the indigenous people. The trade 
in, and use of, cannabis was one such type of interaction. It must be stressed that this kind 
of thinking has been emphatically rejected by any intelligent society in recent times. This 
can leave one in no doubt that at least the attitudes which led to the prohibition of 
substances like cannabis, stemmed partially from fundamentally incorrect and racialized 
institutional ideas which had as their result, policies of segregation. This already erodes the 
                                                          
14 Ibid at pp37-39. 
15 Ibid at pp39-41. 
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legitimacy of the purpose of early cannabis prohibition, but even more so does the history 
of medical research on the effects of cannabis.  
Some early studies undertaken on the effects of cannabis were conducted at 
asylums in British India, and here it must be highlighted that the studies on the effects of 
cannabis were heavily influenced by the prevailing views of the psychology discipline of the 
time, as detailed above. Therefore at the outset, the research and studies undertaken on 
the effects of cannabis were skewed completely by the incorrect prevailing psychological 
attitudes. In short, it was believed that cannabis induced or exacerbated insanity in the 
Indian asylum patients, and the prevailing studies seemed to suggest that this conclusion 
stemmed from the fact that more and more admitted patients happened to be users of 
cannabis.16 Naturally, these studies made the mistake of assuming that correlation between 
the increased number of patients and the increase in number of patients who smoked 
cannabis were indicative of a causal link, however, such beliefs based on statistics of the 
time did entrench the apparent link between insanity and cannabis consumption, and were 
disseminated throughout the British Colonies:  
‘The view that cannabis caused insanity amongst the ‘natives’ in India was quickly 
adopted throughout the British colonies, especially in places where indentured 
Indians were shipped… one of the earliest available government discussions on 
cannabis is found in the Natal Indian Immigrants Commission Report (RIIC). This was 
published in 1887, at the height of ‘criminal anthropology’, religious zealotry, and 
concern about cannabis causing insanity amongst Indians.’17 
Despite the increasingly negative attitude toward cannabis and its consumers, and 
the increasingly racialized psychology surrounding the cannabis trade and all interactions 
flowing therefrom, Burchell notes that until 1922, there was effectively still no legislation 
which in any way prohibited cannabis trade and consumption.18  Other than a 1903 
Ordinance of the Orange Free State which prohibited the cultivation and possession of 
cannabis, and a 1905 Ordinance which outlawed the trade in opium, there was a total lack 
                                                          
16 Ibid at pp41-42. 
17 Ibid at pp42-43. 
18 J M Burchell Principles of Criminal Law Vol 4 2014 Juta & Co. Ltd at p798. 
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of anti-substance legislation in South Africa (at the time a British colony).19   Paterson 
however points out that: 
‘This was not the case in the Cape Colony, where cannabis was prohibited under Act 
34 of 1891…It was not until around 1912 that the panic around the use of cannabis 
grew to the point that there were calls for the enforcement of that law.’20 
Paterson also notes, citing Chanock, that ‘there was a marked tendency to consider 
[and view] dagga in relation to the racially marginal Indian and coloured populations.’21  It is 
therefore not surprising that ‘by 1921, there was real panic [by the ruling powers] 
surrounding cannabis use in South Africa…this was mainly a concern in the Western Cape, 
where cannabis is said to have ‘caused’ criminality.’22  This evidence illustrates quite clearly 
that the advent of cannabis prohibitions in South Africa stemmed directly from concerns 
regarding integration with and control of, the indigenous population, as well as from 
reliance on (understandably) inaccurate medical and psychological research. The difference 
between cannabis prohibition prior to 1922 and thereafter, lies in the fact that prior to 
1922, there was still debate occurring as to whether these concerns justified prohibition of 
cannabis, despite the dangers it was thought to have the potential to create. After 1922, the 
matter began to devolve from one where commissions and institutions applied to the 
government to set prohibitive measures in place, to one where the government in a blanket 
fashion began to prohibit cannabis use and trade without bothering to justify its prohibitive 
measures.  
The adoption of the Customs and Excise Duties Amendment Act 35 of 1922, 
constituted the first blanket prohibition by the government on the use, cultivation and sale 
of cannabis, cocaine and a number of other substances which could be deemed ‘habit 
forming drugs’ and this amendment also made provision for search and seizure in the 
enforcement of the new substance prohibition legislation.23 Additional comprehensive 
                                                          
19 Dagga Prohibition Ordinance of 1903 (O) cited in Burchell Ibid at p798. 
20 Op cit note 10 at p47. 
21 M Chanock The Making of South African Legal Culture 2001 cited in Paterson op cit note 10 at p47. 
22 Op cit note 10 at p52. 
23 Op cit note 18 at p798. 
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legislation was issued in the form of the Medical, Dental and Pharmacy Act 13 of 1928 (‘the 
Pharmacy Act’), following a rise in the use of cannabis by the general population which led 
to increased calls for more stringent measures against the use of drugs.24  The Weeds Act 42 
of 1937 was later passed, and this established cannabis prohibition to a greater extent in 
South Africa. Paterson explains that:  
‘This Act placed the onus on the occupier or owner of a property to prevent land 
being used to produce cannabis, or any other plant declared a ‘weed’ in South Africa. 
If the occupier or owner failed to do so they were guilty of an offence, and 
furthermore, the government was empowered to remove the plant from their land at 
the owner or occupier’s expense. Imprisonment was allowed for a second offence 
concerning the same weed species, and it was required that the declared weed was 
destroyed on observation. It also made the movement and trade of seeds of declared 
weeds illegal.’25 
Thus the Pharmacy Act and the Weeds Act served firmly to establish the 
government’s early prohibition of cannabis use and trade. These statutes served to give the 
impression that the issue of cannabis was settled in South Africa. What is of particular 
interest is that in the wake of cannabis prohibition in South Africa circa 1922 and beyond, 
cannabis prohibitions went  unenforced in rural areas owing to the fact that ‘moderate 
dagga smoking [was] of little importance form the point of view of public order and 
welfare’.26   
Internationally across the developed world, from the 1960s the use of cannabis and 
other ‘dependence-producing’ substances became more popular, and widely consumed. 
South Africa increasingly became a country that exported cannabis.27 International 
organisations, such as the United Nations and their representative states began to clamp 
down on the international trade of drugs including cannabis, and various international 
treaties and protocols began emerging as a means to encourage (and if not, to strong-arm) 
                                                          
24 Op cit note 18 at p798. 
25 Op cit note 10 at p54. 
26 M Chanock The Making of South African Legal Culture 2001 cited in Paterson op cit note 10 at p124. 
27 Op cit note 10. 
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those states who were somewhat still undecided as to the extent their prohibitions should 
be increased.28 Kruger et al in their position paper on cannabis sativa, compiled for the 
South African National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence (‘SANCA’), describe the 
international obligations which started binding the international community as follows: 
‘The adoption of the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 is 
regarded as a milestone in the history of international drug control as it successfully 
pulled the majority of the world’s governments, including South Africa, into line in 
one comprehensive drug treaty. Earlier treaties had only controlled opium, coca and 
derivatives such as morphine, heroin and cocaine. The Single Convention, adopted in 
1961, consolidated those treaties and broadened their scope to include cannabis and 
drugs whose effects are similar to those of the drugs specified.’29 
The judgment of the Cape High Court in Prince sets out the position of the Single Convention 
regarding cannabis as follows: 
‘Cannabis is listed as a drug in two of the schedules to the Single Convention. The 
Convention obliges the parties to it to adopt any special measures of control which in 
their opinion are necessary, having regard to the particularly dangerous properties of 
a drug included in the schedules. One of the principal features of the controls 
required to be implemented by the Single Convention is that the parties to it are 
required to implement provisions aimed at limiting the possession and use of drugs 
(including cannabis) to medical and scientific purposes. The Convention further 
requires each party to adopt such measures as will ensure that, inter alia, possession 
of those drugs shall be a punishable offence.’30 
Although not a party to the Single Convention at the time of its inception, South 
Africa did become a party to the United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances 
                                                          
28 G Kruger et al. SANCA National Position Paper on Cannabis Sativa 2014 Compiled at the request of the 
SANCA National Treatment Portfolio accessed from http://sancanational.org/index.php/position-
papers.html#edn1 at Ch2. 
29 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 cited in Kruger et al ibid at Ch 2. A full discussion 
of the domestic legislative framework and international law instruments governing cannabis is undertaken in 
chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
30 Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 1998 (8) BCLR 796 (C) at 985. 
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(1971) which listed cannabis as a psychotropic substance in Schedule 1.31 According to this 
convention, the parties to it were, and are mandated to prohibit all use of cannabis other 
than specifically limited scientific and medical use.32 Another international instrument, the 
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and other Substances 
(1988), required parties to establish the possession and personal consumption of 
psychotropic substances and narcotics as an offence in their domestic law, and again 
cannabis was listed as such a substance.33 These international instruments are discussed in 
more detail regarding their applicable articles in Chapter 5. From the 1960s all through the 
height of the Apartheid era, South Africa therefore ostensibly acquired international 
obligations under these instruments to not only continue the cannabis prohibition, but to 
ensure that the prohibition measures in domestic law were even more comprehensive. 
During the apartheid era, following inception of the various international obligations 
(devised to bind states to a programme of drug eradication), the prohibition of cannabis in 
South Africa became more strictly enforced. This was owed partially to the fact that the 
banned political parties of the time resorted to illicit means (including trading in cannabis 
and other drugs) to raise income for their resistance activities.34 Added to this, the rise of 
the libertarian ‘hippie’ culture in many capitalist states during the height of the Cold War 
became associated with drug use, particularly cannabis.35 Therefore, using or possessing 
cannabis became intimately linked in the mind of the State with political activism and 
radicalism, which further heightened the State’s attempts to eradicate cannabis use 
throughout South Africa. Paterson stresses the racialisation of cannabis politics during the 
Apartheid era and even prior to Apartheid being formalised into law: 
‘…cannabis use was not a political issue until such a time as the ‘non-white’ 
population came into great enough contact with the politically dominant ‘white’ 
population to make this contact seem like a threat that needed to be reduced. 
                                                          
31 Supra at 985. 
32 Supra at 985. 
33 Supra at 985. 
34 Op cit note 10. 
35 Op cit note 10 at pp121-127. 
15 
K KOWALSKI 
Cannabis use was not a problem unless there was great enough contact between the 
‘white’ colonists and the cannabis-using ‘non-white’ population, and, in this sense, 
cannabis laws may be located in the greater schema of the so-called ‘grand 
apartheid’ design. At the very least, both cannabis law and apartheid law rest on the 
same ideological foundation. Stemming from this ‘scientifically-justified’ racism and 
(not coincidentally) the prohibition of cannabis, we find a direct correlation between 
resistance to institutionalised racism and resistance to cannabis laws.’36 
The primary instrument in South African domestic law which served to entrench 
cannabis prohibition in the post-Apartheid era (circa 1990 and thereafter), was and still is, 
the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992, which is reinforced by the earlier Medicines 
and Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965 as well as other legislation aimed at 
combating general and drug-related crime.37 At present, this legislative framework is still 
the source of the cannabis prohibition in South Africa. As mentioned previously, it is this 
framework and the State’s claimed purpose in maintaining it which must be challenged if 
cannabis is to successfully be decriminalized using the courts as a mechanism. It is precisely 
because of this history of racialized prohibition that the issue of cannabis legalisation is of 
particular meaning and importance to South Africa, its citizens and their basic human 
dignity, culture and freedom. I will argue in this dissertation that the prohibition even in 
present terms violates several fundamental and inalienable human rights of people within 
South Africa’s borders, particularly the equality right, with its internal requirement of 
rationality. The prohibition of cannabis, whilst the State continues to permit consumption of 
alcohol and tobacco, is not rational, particularly in light of the manner in which the State’s 
alleged purposes for the differentiation between the two, have developed directly from the 
attitudes discussed in this part.  
                                                          
36 Op cit note 10 at pp117-118. 
37 Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992; Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965; 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 86 of 1992; Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998; Tobacco 
Products Control Amendment Act 12 of 1999; Prevention of and Treatment for Substance Abuse Act 70 of 
2008. A full discussion of the domestic legislative framework and international law instruments governing 
cannabis is undertaken in chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
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This violation is exacerbated by the very history of racialized politics, psychology and 
criminology which led to the current prohibition. Put differently, it is irrational that cannabis 
is prohibited, while other substances (like alcohol and tobacco) which also had a flourishing 
early trade and culture of consumption, are permissible. It is even worse yet, when one 
considers that cannabis was likely only treated differently owing to early inaccurate pseudo-
psychological and criminological attitudes which were almost entirely misinformed by racist 
thinking.  
*I am very grateful for the work of Craig Paterson, submitted as a thesis at Rhodes University, on which I have 
heavily relied in constructing this chapter. 
 
2. PRINCE II: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT AND 
DISTINGUISHING THIS CASE FROM A FUTURE CHALLENGE. 
The case of Prince was brought to the Constitutional Court under the right in section 
15(1) (read with section 31(1)) of the Constitution to freedom of religion, belief and culture. 
It was contended that the legislative scheme regulating the use and possession of cannabis 
(set out in the previous chapter), violated this right by being overbroad. Accordingly the 
court was asked whether the use of cannabis ought to be exempted from the prohibition 
contained in the legislative scheme, thereby allowing Rastafarians to be exempted from 
criminal prosecution for the consumption of the substance. A majority of the presiding 
Justices held that although the prohibition on cannabis did violate Prince’s right to freedom 
of religion, this violation was properly justified by the State under the limitations clause in 
section 36 of the Constitution.38   
The case arose as a direct result of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope’s 
refusal to register Prince's contract of community service owing to lack of proof that he was 
a fit and proper person under the terms of the Act in question. The reason for this was that 
Prince had two previous convictions for possession of cannabis. What added to the Law 
Society’s decision to refuse his registration was the fact that Prince had also stated 
categorically that he would not cease to consume cannabis, as the consumption of cannabis 
                                                          
38 Supra note 2. 
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was a central and vital part of the Rastafari religion, of which Prince was a follower.39  By the 
time the case reached the Constitutional Court, the constitutionality of the Medicines and 
Related Substances Control Act and the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act was raised as the 
central challenge (both of which prohibited the use and possession of certain drugs, despite 
some exemptions contained in the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act). As Pillay 
notes, ‘the essence of appellant's argument was that the two Acts violated the right to 
freedom of religion protected by the Constitution because there was no exemption for 
cannabis use by Rastafari’.40   
The foremost divergence of opinion between the majority and the minority hinged 
on the question of whether there were less restrictive means to achieve the legitimate 
government purpose of drug abuse prevention, with the majority deciding the issue in the 
negative, with a focus on the practical implications of an exemption system.41 In essence, 
the majority decided that the limitation of the right was justifiable, grounded on the facts 
that:  there is no objective way to distinguish between prohibited trade of cannabis and use 
of the substance for religious purposes; the financial and administrative implications of a 
permit system would place too onerous a burden on the State; and lastly, it is highly 
problematic to determine whether a person in possession of cannabis is genuinely a 
Rastafarian.42 In addressing these objections by the State, the appellant proposed the 
introduction of a permit system to regulate the exemptions, however these suggestions 
were not supported in any way by the majority. This was primarily because the use of a 
"prohibited substance" for medical reasons rested on a number of controlling mechanisms, 
such as limitation of the use of the substance by means of a prescription and oversight by 
                                                          
39 Supra note 2. 
40 A Pillay discussing Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope supra note 2 at paras 92-
96 in the Oxford International Journal of Constitutional Law (2003) Vol 1 p152, accessed from 
http://icon.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/1/152.full.pdf.  
41 Supra note 2 at para 114. 
42 Supra note 2 at paras 114-120 and 128-133. 
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medical practitioners43.   No such controlling mechanisms existed vis-à-vis the Rastafarian 
religion.44 
Ngcobo, Mokgoro, Sachs JJ, and Madlanga AJ for the minority, took a different 
approach to the majority, one which encompassed a ‘reasonable accommodation’ 
methodology.45 The minority felt that the State had failed to show how an exemption would 
undermine the purpose of the law, and that when it came to remedy, the details of an 
exemption would be better left to the realm of the legislature.46 It was stressed by the 
minority that there was a complete lack of evidence to support the State’s contentions that 
any uses for cannabis other than smoking were dangerous, or indeed that smoking cannabis 
in small quantities could cause undue harm.47  The vulnerability of the Rastafari community 
and tolerance in a pluralistic society were the central theme of the separate dissent given by 
Justice Sachs, who believed that "reasonable accommodation" in this case would ensure the 
protection of Rastafari and allow them to practice their religion while allowing the general 
prohibition to remain.48  Justice Sachs favoured a decriminalization approach, stressing that 
this would be consistent with South Africa's international obligations under to the 1961 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (amended by the 1972 Protocol) the 1971 Convention 
on Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 Convention against Illicit Trade in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances.49 He emphasized, moreover, that "limited decriminalisation in 
appropriately controlled circumstances" would strike the necessary balance between the 
interests of the State and the right of freedom of religion.50   
The minority was clearly more sanguine about decriminalizing cannabis, yet it must 
be clearly stated that the minority in no way intended their judgments to mean that they 
                                                          
43Supra note 2 at para 133. 
44Supra note 2 at para 133. 
45 Supra note 2 at paras 75 and 76. 
46 Supra note 2. 
47 Supra note 2. 
48 Supra note 2 at para 148. 
49 Supra note 2 at paras 147, 164-169. 
50Supra note 2 at paras 164-169. 
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supported a blanket decriminalization – rather, they merely accepted the position that an 
exemption for Rastafari users of cannabis would not affect the general prohibition, and left 
open for what purpose the cannabis would actually be used. This is where the majority was 
more correct – arguably the majority’s ultimate decision did no justice regarding the 
freedom of religion and culture of Rastafarians, but their reasoning was sound regarding the 
implications of an exemption regime insofar as regulation thereof is concerned. The 
majority was likely correct that policing an exemption would be entirely the responsibility of 
the State, and therefore when it came to ensuring that the exemption system was not 
abused, the State would bear the ultimate burden and cost thereof.  
That this was the main concern  of the judges of the majority judgment is in no 
doubt, as the court does not only bear the responsibility to see justice done where it is 
called for, but to keep in mind the implications of their decisions which reach well beyond 
the date of judgment. How indeed, would it be possible to ensure that people did not 
merely pretend to be Rastafarian in order to benefit from the cannabis exemption? 
Furthermore, how would it be possible to ensure that Rastafarians did not abuse the system 
and begin selling their cannabis for profit?  
It is understandable that the court saw the possible risk in allowing an exemption. 
This is likely so, because the court, even if relatively few cases of abuse could occur, did not 
want to assume the responsibility of allowing even a fraction of ‘wriggle-room’ under the 
exemption regime they were asked to order. It is further submitted that one of Prince’s fatal 
mistakes, was litigating in pursuance of an exemption in the first place. Exemptions are 
notoriously difficult in practical application, indeed short of qualified doctors bound by 
extensive protocol and institutional codes, it would be extremely laborious to devise an 
entirely new exemption regime without one already in place. Cannabis, in a medical setting, 
can be regulated and controlled in the same way any other medicine may be, and evidence 
of being qualified for an exemption requires little more than medical evidence that the 
patient requires cannabis as a treatment for a very visceral illness or condition. Another 
fatal flaw in the proceedings were a number of concessions made by Prince’s legal counsel 
at High Court level, including a concession to the legitimacy of the State’s purpose in 
prohibiting cannabis use and possession: 
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“As far as the importance of the purpose of the Drugs Act is concerned, namely to 
control the use of dependence-producing substances which includes cannabis, Mr 
Trengove very fairly conceded that this was ‘an important objective’ … As far as the 
relation between the limitation and its purpose is concerned, here again, Mr 
Trengove has very fairly conceded that the prohibition advances the purpose sought 
to be achieved.”51 
By the time the matter reached the Supreme Court of Appeal and Constitutional 
Court levels, this concession would have formed part of the record of appeal and therefore 
would have had an indelible effect on the outcome of the limitations analysis. As stated 
above, providing the less restrictive means contemplated by the applicant could reasonably 
still achieve a legitimate state purpose, those means would be preferable to the means in 
place at the time. Working backwards, it is clear then that the best way forward would not 
have been to bring the matter under an application for a religious exemption on the basis of 
the prohibition being overbroad. The reason is that in asking for an exemption, it almost 
inevitably would lead to the necessity of concessions as to the purpose of the prohibition 
itself being legitimate, provided the prohibition was not overbroad in its application.  
This concession therefore still acknowledged that the State’s declared purpose was 
legitimate, and moreover, that it was of paramount importance. This then made it much 
easier for the majority to place less weight on the side of the nature and importance of 
Prince’s rights when balanced against the importance of the purpose of the limitation 
imposed by the prohibition. Therefore, when it came to assessing the possibility of less 
restrictive means, Prince’s case was already heavily on the back foot. Faced with this, it 
would have been very difficult indeed for Adv. Trengove to convince the court that an 
exemption would be appropriate when balanced against the State’s purpose of prohibiting 
dangerous substances from consumption. 
 
 
                                                          
51 Supra note 30 at 986. 
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3. CHALLENGING THE LEGISLATIVE SCHEME: APPLICATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
INTERPRETATION OF RIGHTS, AND IMPLICATIONS. 
3.1 APPLICATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE FRAMEWORK OF SECTION 8 OF 
THE CONSTITUTION. 
Section 2 of the Constitution mandates that the Constitution is the ‘supreme law’ of 
the Republic, and further states that all law which is inconsistent with the Constitution is 
invalid.52 This is the foundation provision for any Constitutional challenge, as it is the 
authority of this section which establishes the barest possibility of declaring any law invalid, 
providing such law is inconsistent with the Constitution. This section, however, does not 
state what is meant by ‘all law’, or what the implications of invalidity would be, does not tell 
us how such law is declared invalid, and further does not indicate the consequences of 
invalidity. These answers are all sourced elsewhere in the Constitution’s framework. The 
provision in the Bill of Rights which governs application, is section 8. Section 8 (1) of the 
Constitution provides that ‘The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.’53 This is the section which explains what is 
meant by ‘all law’ in section 2.  
The application of the Bill of Rights is, per section 8(1), expansive, and the Bill of 
rights accordingly applies to all law (including national legislation) and binds all organs of 
state. The Bill of Rights also applies horizontally, that is, to private persons per section 8(2), 
however given that the subject of this challenge would be to national legislation, there is no 
need to consider the complex debates governing sections 8(2) and 8(3) of the Constitution 
and the horizontal nature of the Bill of Rights. Two things which do merit discussion 
however, are the interplay between the direct and indirect application of the Bill of Rights, 
and consideration of the difference between the functions of section 8 and section 39(2) of 
the Bill of Rights. Section 8 deals with the application of the Bill of Rights, and section 39(2) 
deals with its interpretation, however courts and litigants have suffered under much 
                                                          
52 Constitution s2. 
53 Constitution s8(1). 
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confusion as to the interplay between the two, which is represented by two different 
approaches to applying the Bill of Rights to rights litigation. 
The starting point when challenging legislation is to assess how this legislation is to 
be tested. There are, simply put, two ways in which the Bill of Rights can apply to law or 
conduct. The first is the direct application, the second is the indirect application. Currie and 
De Waal state the difference between the two approaches as follows, according to their 
purposes: 
‘The purpose of the direct application is to determine whether there is, on a proper 
interpretation of the law and the Bill of Rights, any inconsistency between the two. 
The purpose of indirect application is to determine whether it is possible to avoid, in 
the first place, any inconsistency between the law and the Bill of Rights by a proper 
interpretation of the two.’ 54 
Currie and De Waal continue to illustrate the difference between the two 
approaches by explaining that a direct application of the Bill of rights typically generates 
constitutional remedies, and delineates certain types of specific interventions where 
invalidity exists, whereas an indirect approach does not generate these remedies.55 The 
indirect application cannot generate these remedies, because its purpose is aimed at 
interpreting the law and the Bill of Rights in a manner which makes them consistent with 
each other, rather than declaring the law inconsistent.  
The direct application generates Constitutional remedies only because there is 
something which requires a remedy – if the law in question is interpreted in line with the Bill 
of Rights, then there can be no transgression and therefore no invalidity, which then 
negates the need for a constitutional remedy. A direct application therefore, does not 
attempt to interpret the law in such a way as to avoid inconsistency. Effectively, what an 
applicant does by pursuing a direct application of the Bill of Rights to offending law, is to 
propose to the court that there is no hope of reconciling the offending law with the Bill of 
Rights, and in so doing remove a lengthy consideration of possible harmonious 
                                                          




interpretations from the judicial table. Currie and De Waal explain why this is so: ‘The direct 
application is aimed at exposing inconsistency between the Bill of Rights and law or conduct. 
If there is, the court then declares that law or conduct constitutionally invalid...When law or 
conduct is ruled to be inconsistent with the Constitution it can no longer form part of the 
law.’56 
Despite the apparent differences between the direct and indirect applications, there 
is another construction of the application of Bill of Rights, which negates the differences 
between the two approaches, through use of a ‘general approach’. Cheadle and Davis 
propose that there is little need for distinctions between an indirect and direct application 
of the Bill of Rights. They argue that instead a general approach ought to be adopted, which 
distinguishes between law and conduct, and further between state and private parties, 
rather than between types of application of the Bill of Rights.57 On this approach, the Bill of 
Rights applies to all law, whether this is a piece of legislation or a common-law rule.58 While 
the application of the Bill Rights is universal, the manner in which it engages with conduct of 
private persons differs from the manner in which it engages with legislation or the conduct 
of state bodies.59  
It is therefore clear that in order to establish in what way the Bill of Rights is to apply 
to a Constitutional challenge, the remedy which the applicant wishes to achieve ought to be 
considered first and briefly. In this instance, decriminalization of cannabis is the desired 
outcome, such only being possible if the court should declare the legislation invalid. This is 
because it is simply not possible to interpret the legislation as being permissive of cannabis 
consumption and/or possession. The reason for this, in turn, is that the prohibitive 
legislative scheme must cease to be part of the law of South Africa in its entirety before 
cannabis can be decriminalized. The desired remedy would therefore be one which involves, 
at a minimum, a declaration of constitutional invalidity which renders the prohibitive 
legislative provisions unlawful and of no force and effect. Since this desired remedy is a 
                                                          
56 Ibid. 
57 H Cheadle et al, ‘South African Constitutional Law: A Bill of Rights’ 2013 Lexis Nexis Chapter 1 at pp3-10. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid at pp3-10. 
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‘constitutional’ one, the Bill of Rights must be said in this case to apply directly to the 
offending law. If the offending legislation clearly imposes a prohibition which cannot be 
reconciled with the desired remedy, and cannot be interpreted so as to avoid conflict with 
the Bill of Rights, then this leaves an important question.  
3.2 INTERPRETATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS: SECTION 39 OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 
Section 39 of the Constitution reads as follows: 
‘Interpretation of Bill of Rights 
39. (1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum— 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law. 
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights.’60 
Section 39(2) of the Constitution ‘…obliges courts to interpret any legislation, 
irrespective of whether it implicates a provision in the Bill of Rights. This means that, when a 
piece of legislation is being tested for constitutional compliance, it must be interpreted in a 
manner that promotes the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. As such, the 
provision provides the constitutional mandate to ‘read down’ – that is, to interpret the 
legislation in such a way that it conforms to the Bill of Rights and so avoids inconsistency 
between itself and the Bill.’61  The issue then becomes one of what to do when legislation is 
so clearly in conflict with the Bill of Rights, or when the desired remedy is not one which can 
be achieved through section 39(2)’s approach? The correct answer would seem to be, that 
                                                          
60 Constitution, s39. 
61 Op cit note 57 at pp3-10. 
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even if legislation stands to be tested for inconsistency against the Bill of Rights, the correct 
approach is first to attempt to interpret the legislation in conformity with the Bill before 
proceeding to declare the legislation invalid. Davis states as much in Cheadle, Davis and 
Haysom: 
‘Section 39(2)…is applicable in at least two separate ways. It firstly contains a 
presumption of constitutionality; that is that all legislation must be interpreted to be 
congruent with the Constitution. Where this proves to be impossible, the legislation 
stands to be set aside as being unconstitutional. The presumption is designed to 
prevent the situation where the legislation is interpreted in the worst possible light so 
as to justify a finding of unconstitutionality.’62 
  This poses a problem for this case however, as it is difficult to see how a prohibition 
which limits several important rights could be interpreted in a way that could vindicate it. 
Put another way, if the rights in question are violated and limited by a prohibition and its 
supporting framework, how can a prohibition be interpreted as anything other than a 
prohibition? In this case therefore, an argument could be put forward for favouring an 
approach that goes straight to assessing whether the law in question is inconsistent with the 
Bill of Rights. The role of section 39(2) in this instance, would be to empower the court to 
conduct this assessment as section 39(2) mandates – through the prism of the Bill of Rights 
and in accordance with its spirit, objects and purports 
Section 39(1)(a) instructs a court, when interpreting the Bill of Rights itself, to do so 
in accordance with the values that underpin our democratic society based on equality, 
human dignity and freedom. This is not an optional mandate – whenever the court is 
interpreting the Bill, it must do so in accordance with these principles. The rest of section 
39(1) is also important for our purposes. Section 39(1)(b) is particularly valuable in litigating 
Bill of Rights disputes, for the role it plays in bringing international law and international 
human rights instruments to the fore in judicial adjudication. Section 39(1)(b) instructs the 
court, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, to consider international law. Again, this is not an 
optional directive. The use of the word ‘must’ in section 39(1)(b) indicates that a court has 
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no option but to consider international law and its various instruments, when performing an 
interpretation or assessment of the Bill of Rights.  Davis states the revolutionary and genius 
character of this provision regarding international law use and its breadth as follows: 
‘The term “public international law”, as contained in section 35(1), has been 
interpreted to allow recourse to treaties such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights to which South Africa is not a party. Accordingly, it would appear that the 
section allows South African judges to draw on the entire field of international 
human rights treaties even where South Africa is not a party, including international 
custom as evidenced by general practice, other international conventions which 
establish rules recognized by contesting states and the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations.’63 
The Constitutional Court has itself recognised the importance of this provision 
through its jurisprudence. In S v Makwanyane64 the court noted the following: 
‘International agreements and customary international law accordingly provide a 
framework within which Chapter 3 can be evaluated and understood, and for that 
purpose decisions of tribunals dealing with comparable instruments…may provide 
guidance as to the correct interpretation of particular provisions…’65 
This makes it clear, that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, the court is mandated to 
draw on the wealth of international law instruments available to it, regardless of whether or 
not South Africa is signatory to the relevant instrument. Section 39(1)(c) is somewhat 
different, and is equally important for the purposes of a challenge to the legislative scheme 
prohibiting cannabis. Section 39(1)(c) stipulates that when conducting interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights, and when interpreting legislation, the court ‘may’ have recourse to foreign 
law. In this regard, our courts have taken a conservative and cautious approach to the use of 
foreign law in adjudication of South African Bill of Rights disputes. The statement of the 
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64 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC). 
65 Supra at 35. 
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court in Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape66 illustrates the approach which the 
courts have taken, and ought to rightly take. In this regard, the court stated that ‘…the use 
of foreign precedent requires circumspection and acknowledgement that transplants require 
careful management…’67 A court should thus apply a cautious approach to the use of 
foreign law when it considers it, however an overly cautious approach has the potential to 
hinder the development of our law where there is a desperate need for it.  
3.3 IMPLICATIONS: METHODOLOGY AND PROCESS 
The implications of this chapter for the challenge to the cannabis prohibition are 
clear. When interpreting our Bill of Rights throughout the assessment of this challenge, a 
court may, and rightly should, consider foreign law in formulating and reasoning a decision 
on the matter, and must do so in a way which promotes the spirit, object and purport of the 
Bill. When undertaking a consideration of foreign law, however, the court must take a 
cautious approach regarding the methodology of consideration of foreign law, while at the 
same time not being overly cautious in its use of foreign law. While caution is recommended 
per Sanderson reasoning, it is submitted that the caution to be employed should concern 
the methodology of foreign law use, not in the decision of whether or not to use foreign 
precedent. If the ultimate conclusion reached by a court is in whatever small or large part 
influenced by the consideration of foreign law, there is the potential for legitimacy concerns 
to be sustained unless the proper methodology is employed.  
It is therefore apparent that the manner in which this challenge ought to be 
undertaken is through direct application of the Bill of Rights to the issue, per section 8. The 
law under challenge is sourced in national legislation, and therefore it is the State who is a 
party to the dispute. Section 8(1) clearly indicates that the Bill binds the State, and applies 
to ‘all law’ including national legislation. Section 39(2), although mandating a reading of 
legislation which is harmonious with the Bill (which is not possible if legalisation of cannabis 
is the desired result), can be said to apply in this instance as a directive to the court to 
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conduct the assessment of the challenge through the prism of the Bill, and in accordance 
with its objects, spirit and purport.  
4. THE INFRINGEMENT OF SECTION 9: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EQUALITY RIGHT AND OTHER 
CONSIDERATIONS. 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter contains a full appraisal of the right to equality – one of the rights which is 
implicated in the challenge to the prohibition of cannabis. It was stated in Chapter II above 
that Prince’s case failed for several reasons. One such reason is that Prince brought his 
challenge narrowly under the right to freedom of religion, and argued for an exemption for 
a small part of the population. As discussed, such a narrow challenge, coupled with the 
potential problems in effecting his desired remedy, brought the case to its inevitable 
conclusion against Prince, yet it remains to be seen what the outcome would be if a 
challenge were brought on the basis that to prohibit cannabis use constitutes a violation of 
the rights of every South African citizen, and not merely a violation of the rights of a small 
section of the population. Arguably, the parameters would be greatly different for several 
reasons.  
First, a violation of the rights of the entire population (whether cannabis users or not) 
would arguably carry a greater burden of justification (to be discussed in Chapter V) by the 
State and would amount to a challenge with more potential to sway the court toward a 
positive conclusion. So much was suggested by the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee, following a communique by Prince to the Committee (after his unsuccessful 
litigation) alleging that his international human rights had been infringed by the State Party 
(South Africa). Prince, in his submissions, claimed violations by South Africa, of his rights 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its protocol, which South 
Africa became party to, and brought into force in South Africa on 10 March 1999 and 28 
November 2002 respectively.68 The Committee received Prince’s information as well as that 
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29 
K KOWALSKI 
of the State Party, and communicated its responses in a document on November 14 2007.69 
The Committee responded to an averment made by the State party, which response 
intimated that the State Party had not entirely barred the way forward for a broad-based 
challenge to the cannabis prohibition. The State Party’s averment is reproduced as follows:  
‘…domestic remedies have not been exhausted, as the author [Prince] did not, in his 
applications, to the domestic courts, seek to have the prohibition on cannabis 
declared unconstitutional and invalid, and to have such prohibitions removed from 
the respective act for the benefit of the whole population, as is the usual way in 
challenging legislative provisions which are believed to be inconsistent with the 
Constitution…’70 
Prince employed a narrow attempt to declare the prohibition of cannabis 
unconstitutional, but restricted this attempt to the rights of the Rastafari, and the State 
Party placed emphasis on the fact that Prince did not challenge the general prohibition on 
the use and possession of cannabis. Prince was seen by the State Party to have accepted 
that the prohibition served a legitimate state purpose, and Prince further alleged that only 
Rastafaris should be exempt, should the court have found that the prohibition was 
overbroad. In its submissions to the Committee, the State may have tacitly indicated that 
there is potential for success of an argument regarding the legitimacy of the purpose 
purportedly served by the prohibition and whether such a purpose is even capable of being 
served in South African society.   
The Committee responded to the State Party’s averments in a manner which 
intimated that, should there be an objective basis for a challenge to the State Party’s 
conduct in prohibiting cannabis use, the outcome may be different under the International 
Covenant. After considering the Prince judgment, and having regard to South Africa’ section 
36 limitations analysis, the Committee made the following statement: 
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‘A differentiation based on reasonable and objective criteria does not amount to 
prohibited discrimination within the meaning of article 26 …The limitation therefore 
does not violate the right to equal treatment before the law.’71 
It seems therefore, that the results of the Committee’s findings have another 
implication. If proof could be produced under the auspices of a challenge based on the 
equality provision (as one possibility), that there was no ‘objective’ reason to differentiate 
cannabis users from tobacco and alcohol users for example, then it is more likely that the 
legislative scheme would be held to offend the Constitution, and could also be held to 
infringe section 26 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. This is one 
example of the greater possibility of success for a challenge based on rights including 
equality particularly. 
Secondly, there would be no need for the court to concern itself with the problems 
incumbent on an exemption, if the desired outcome is legalisation or decriminalisation at a 
minimum. So much was suggested implicitly by the Constitutional Court in the Prince 
judgment, albeit in different words.72 The court, by suggesting that an exemption is too 
difficult to police and by suggesting further that exemption cannot achieve the State’s 
purpose (which Trengove conceded as legitimate), effectively left the door ajar for the 
possibility that a different challenge might succeed. This is apparent because, by not arguing 
for an exemption, and by basing the entire challenge on the notion that the State’s purpose 
is not legitimate, a litigant could avoid the trouble commensurate with exemption, and 
would ground an inquiry squarely on the legitimacy of the State’s purpose in prohibiting 
cannabis. By directly attacking the legitimacy of the State’s purpose in prohibiting cannabis, 
a litigant would therefore be better placed to discharge his onus of proving that rights in the 
Bill are violated, and would create a heavier burden for the State to argue that it in fact has 
a legitimate purpose.  
Thirdly, by implicating a battery of rights including equality, instead of restricting the 
inquiry to one right to religion alone, the court likely has far less scope for holding that a 
right is not infringed.  
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72 Prince supra note 2 at paras 114-120 and 128-133. 
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An appraisal of all three rights to equality, dignity and privacy would be beyond the 
breadth and scope of this dissertation, particularly because each right would have to be 
separately considered under the application of the limitations analysis in section 36 of the 
Constitution. This chapter shall therefore focus on the right to equality in section 9 of the 
Constitution as one of the means to challenge the legislative scheme. That the challenge, if 
brought before a court, would require analysis of all three rights, is undeniable given the 
increased opportunities for a finding of constitutional invalidity – naturally the astute 
litigator would raise arguments on all three of the strongest rights in relation to this 
challenge.  
The right to equality contains, in section 9(1), a rationality enquiry (as will become 
apparent later in this chapter), which requires the court to consider critically whether the 
purpose of the infringement of the right is legitimate, and which further requires the court 
to assess whether a rational connection exists between this purpose, and the means which 
the State has chosen to achieve it.73 It is submitted that by striking a comparison between 
users of alcohol and tobacco, on the one hand, and the users of cannabis on the other, it will 
be possible to persuasively argue that the differentiation between these classes of people is 
irrational, and therefore cannot pass constitutional muster. Before proposing an argument 
based on the right to equality, it will be necessary to conduct a brief appraisal of other 
considerations which a court inevitably considers in matters of rights infringement, for they 
influence a court in the manner in which it approaches its determination regarding 






                                                          
73 Harksen v Lane NO and Others 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC). 
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4.2 THE APPROACH OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN ASSESSING INFRINGEMENT OF 
RIGHTS. 
4.2.1 CONSIDERATIONS OF THE COURT. 
When adjudicating any constitutional challenge which has the State as a party to the 
litigation, the court does not only have to dispose of the substantive issues raised by the 
challenge. The court finds itself in a position where one party to the dispute is designated 
under the Constitution as an arm of government with its own objectives, powers and 
functions, and therefore other considerations become pertinent in adjudicating the final 
outcome and in reasoning toward a decision. Section 8 clearly binds the State to the Bill of 
Rights, but the extent to which the State is bound often falls to be a matter of interpretation 
by the courts. When adjudicating rights infringements purportedly committed by the State, 
the court therefore cannot merely make findings on the substantive issue without recourse 
to other important considerations which are implicated when the State is a party to 
litigation. What follows is a brief consideration of some other considerations which are 
often brought to bear on rights adjudication. In turn, this section shall canvass briefly the 
considerations of Separation of Powers and the role of public opinion in rights adjudication. 
4.2.2 SEPARATION OF POWERS 
While the separation of powers may not be in issue when the court decides whether 
or not rights have been infringed, it is nonetheless a relevant consideration which will weigh 
heavily on the court’s mind throughout the reasoning process. This is so, because despite 
the issue of whether a right has been infringed being one for the court to decide with 
impunity, once a right has been found to be infringed, the issue of remedy must be 
addressed. It is in the arena of remedy argument where the separation of powers becomes 
of particular consideration to the court, as the remedial powers of the courts are extensive 
once a right has been unjustifiably infringed.  
Section 172(1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution provide the court with extensive 
remedial powers once the court has found law or conduct to be inconsistent with the 
Constitution.74 Not only does section 172(1) deem it acceptable for the court to declare law 
                                                          
74 Constitution, s172(1) (a) and (b) which read as follows: 
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or conduct which is inconsistent with the Constitution invalid, it makes this peremptory. This 
means that even with considerations of separation of powers, a court has no choice 
concerning whether or not to declare the law or conduct invalid if it is in fact, 
unconstitutional. The choice vested in the court, however, regards which remedy the court 
will order once it has declared such law or conduct invalid. The court’s extensive remedial 
powers cover any remedy which is ‘just and equitable’, and the decision of what constitutes 
a just and equitable remedy is left within the court’s discretion. It is at this juncture, and not 
in deciding whether rights have been infringed, where the separation of powers is 
effectively pitted against the successful applicant’s right to an equitable remedy which 
secures him justice, and it is this balancing act which the court finds itself employing that 
creates space for the pivotal role of the separation of powers doctrine.  
There is no explicit separation of powers provision in the Constitution. Separate 
sections of the Constitution designate the powers and functions of the ‘arms’ of 
government.75 Together, these separations of functions, and the powers the relevant arms 
have vested in them by the Constitution to perform such functions, make up South Africa’s 
conception of the separation of powers. The doctrine, it is submitted, must be considered 
along with notions of judicial deference in today’s political climate, because it is this notion 
which informs the court’s articular construction of the separation of powers. In Glenister76 
the court stated the following regarding the separation of powers in the Constitution: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
S172 
1. When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court : 
a. must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to 
the extent of its inconsistency; and 
b. may make any order that is just and equitable, including : 
i. an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and 
ii. an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any 
conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect. 
75 The Constitution s43 deals with the allocation of legislative power to the National, Provincial and Local 
legislative bodies, S85 deals with executive power vesting in the hands of the President and Cabinet and the 
National Executive, and 165(1) vests the judicial power in the courts. 
76 Glenister v President of the RSA (1) 2009 (1) SA 287 (CC). 
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‘It is by now axiomatic that the doctrine of separation of powers is part of our 
constitutional design.  Its inception in our constitutional jurisprudence can be traced 
back to Constitutional Principle VI, which is one of the principles which governed the 
drafting of our Constitution…In our constitutional democracy, the courts are the 
ultimate guardians of the Constitution.  They not only have the right to intervene in 
order to prevent the violation of the Constitution, they also have the duty to do so.  
It is in the performance of this role that courts are more likely to confront the 
question of whether to venture into the domain of other branches of government 
and the extent of such intervention.  It is a necessary component of the doctrine of 
separation of powers that courts have a constitutional obligation to ensure that the 
exercise of power by other branches of government occurs within constitutional 
bounds.  But even in these circumstances, courts must observe the limits of their 
powers.’77 
The court thus acknowledged that, where called to do so, the courts must 
sometimes interrogate the tricky question of whether or not to intervene in the functions of 
the other arms of government, and acknowledged further that the separation of powers 
doctrine may in fact require such intervention. The same court in Doctors for Life78 has 
stressed that there may be limits on this intervention power of the courts, but that these 
limits should not render the court’s duty to uphold the Constitution inoperable. This duty is 
vested in the courts specifically by Section 167(4)(e) of the Constitution, and echoes the 
supremacy clause, which requires that ‘the obligations imposed by [the Constitution] must 
be fulfilled’.79 The United States Supreme Court has also pronounced on the doctrine in its 
own jurisprudence. In Obergefell v Hodges the court split 5-4 about the decision to award 
marriage license to both same-sex and opposite sex couples.80 The minority said that the 
decision of marriages should be one for the legislature not for the courts, while the majority 
                                                          
77 Supra at paras 29 to 34. 
78 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) at paras 
37-38. 
79 Supra at paras 37-38. 
80 Obergefell et al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et al. US SC No. 14–556 June 26, 2015. 
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found no impediment of this nature in their decision to award marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples.81  
The minority opinion, penned by Justice Roberts, upheld a rigorous doctrine of the 
separation of powers in stating that ‘…this Court is not a legislature. Whether same-sex 
marriage is a good idea should be of no concern to us. Under the Constitution, judges have 
power to say what the law is, not what it should be.’82 The minority opinion therefore 
considered that even in the face of severe rights violations, to intervene would be to 
trespass too far on the territory of the legislature. The minority therefore evidenced a highly 
strict interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine, which is already more rigid than 
that envisioned by South Africa’s Constitution. The majority opinion, drafted by Justice 
Kennedy, acknowledged that there may be merit, in cases where the violation of 
fundamental rights is balanced against the need for democratic processes to regulate these 
issues, in allowing for the democratic processes to dictate change, however the court also 
acknowledged that: 
‘Of course, the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process 
for change, so long as that process does not abridge fundamental rights [emphasis 
added]…Thus, when the rights of persons are violated, “the Constitution requires 
redress by the courts,” notwithstanding the more general value of democratic 
decisionmaking…The dynamic of our constitutional system is that individuals need 
not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental right. The Nation’s courts 
are open to injured individuals who come to them to vindicate their own direct, 
personal stake in our basic charter. An individual can invoke a right to constitutional 
protection when he or she is harmed, even if the broader public disagrees and even 
if the legislature refuses to act [emphasis added].’83 
The majority opinion thus evidences a more flexible and nuanced understanding of 
the doctrine where fundamental rights are at stake. It acknowledged the value in a cautious 
approach to the intervention power of the courts, but still decided to tip the balance in 
                                                          
81 Supra. 
82 Justice Roberts Dissenting opinion Supra at 2. 
83 Justice Kennedy majority opinion supra at 24. 
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favour of upholding fundamental rights, stressing that where the violation is severe, the 
separation of powers doctrine itself provides that the function of the courts is to uphold the 
Constitution. Returning to South Africa, the Constitutional court in Allpay Consolidated 
Investment84 stressed the need for the court to acknowledge a construction of the doctrine 
which not only allows the court to intervene when needed, but makes the failure to do so 
(even for the purpose of judicial caution) a failure to carry out judicial responsibility under 
the Constitution: 
‘There can be no doubt that the separation of powers attributes responsibility to the 
courts for ensuring that unconstitutional conduct is declared invalid and that 
constitutionally mandated remedies are afforded for violations of the Constitution.  
This means that the Court must provide effective relief for infringements of 
constitutional rights…Hence, the answer to the separation of powers argument lies 
in the express provisions of section 172(1) of the Constitution.  The corrective 
principle embodied there allows correction to the extent of the constitutional 
inconsistency…’85 
Thus where there is a constitutional inconsistency, the court should not hesitate to 
correct the inconsistency. Judicial caution is necessary, but what these examples of 
jurisprudence show is that judicial caution should not be a dampener on the courts’ duty to 
declare unconstitutional conduct or law invalid, and the authority for this is none other than 
section 172(1) of the Constitutional text itself. Judicial caution and timidity in the face of the 
separation of powers doctrine, properly construed, does not mean that courts should be 
slow to stridently interrogate whether or not a right has been infringed, and does not mean 
that the court should not properly invalidate such infringement. It may indeed be said that 
judicial deference to the notion of separation of powers should not feature heavily in the 
interrogation at this stage, but should be more rigorously considered in the process of 
deciding what remedial action to take once having declared the law or conduct invalid. As 
will be shown in Chapter VI, the question of remedy is inextricably bound to considerations 
                                                          
84 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer of the South African 
Social Security Agency and Others 2014 (6) BCLR 641 (CC) 
85 Supra at paras 42 and 45. 
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of separation of powers and judicial deference, and this is arguably the correct approach. 
The same caution that is afforded remedial action (the stage of judicial decision-making 
which most affects the functioning of the legislative arm of government) does not, and 
should not feature at the stage where the court decides whether or not rights have been 
infringed. 
4.2.3 PUBLIC OPINION 
Public opinion is a consideration which gives regard to the moral climate of society, 
and has a bearing on the manner in which rights are interpreted and applied to issues in 
litigation. Public opinion has an uneasy status in adjudication internationally, because on the 
one hand, for the court’s judgments to have institutional legitimacy, they must be accepted 
by the public at large. On the other hand, for a court to be influenced or strong-armed by 
the opinion of the public would undermine the court’s duty to dispense justice without 
extrinsic influence, and would effectively mean that the citizens of a country, and not its 
judiciary, are responsible for the outcomes in human rights litigation especially. The role of 
public opinion in South Africa was addressed in the seminal case of Makwanyane.86 This 
case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the death penalty – an issue of 
sentencing in criminal law which at the time seemed as entrenched as the prohibition of 
cannabis seems to be today. During the court’s hearing of argument and in the lead-up to 
penning of the judgment, there was mass public feeling for the retention of capital 
punishment in the criminal justice system, and the State relied heavily on the argument of 
favourable public opinion toward the death penalty to attempt to justify its retention in our 
law.87 The State and public also based much of their argument on the deterrent purpose of 
the death penalty. 
Chief Justice Chaskalson, for a unanimous court, gave a reverberating appraisal of the 
role of public opinion where fundamental rights are concerned: 
‘Public opinion may have some relevance to the enquiry, but, in itself, it is no substitute 
for the duty vested in the Courts to interpret the Constitution and to uphold its provisions 
                                                          
86 Supra note 64. 
87 M Zlotnick ‘The Death Penalty and Public Opinion’ (1995) Paper presented at the Centre for the Study of 
Violence and Reconciliation, Seminar No. 4, 28 June. 
38 
K KOWALSKI 
without fear or favour. If public opinion were to be decisive, there would be no need for 
constitutional adjudication. The protection of rights could then be left to Parliament, 
which has a mandate from the public, and is answerable to the public for the way its 
mandate is exercised, but this would be a return to parliamentary sovereignty, and a 
retreat from the new legal order established by the 1993 Constitution [emphasis 
added]…The very reason for establishing the new legal order, and for vesting the power 
of judicial review of all legislation in the courts, was to protect the rights of minorities 
and others who cannot protect their rights adequately through the democratic process. 
Those who are entitled to claim this protection include the social outcasts and 
marginalised people of our society. It is only if there is a willingness to protect the worst 
and the weakest amongst us that all of us can be secure that our own rights will be 
protected [emphasis added].’88 
He went on to use the words of the United States Supreme Court to reinforce the role of 
the court in adjudicating rights issues, and to bolster his conclusion that where fundamental 
rights are concerned, the courts rightly have the sole mandate on the interpretation to be 
given to these rights. In using the US Supreme Court’s language, Chaskalson CJ made it clear 
that in some rare instances, the public majority and their duly elected representatives ought 
rightly to have no part in preventing certain decisions regarding fundamental human rights: 
‘The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and 
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right 
to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and 
assembly and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on 
the outcome of no elections [emphasis added].’89 
The implication of this is that where fundamental rights are in issue, it sometimes 
becomes the court’s mandate to go against countermajoritarian dilemma-style arguments 
which tout the separation of powers and pin their banner to the importance of public 
                                                          
88 Supra note 64 at 431. 
89 Chaskalson CJ quoting  US Supreme Court Justice Jackson in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 625, 638 (1943) Supra note 64 at 432. 
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opinion. It in fact becomes the court’s role to ignore the wishes of a duly elected Parliament 
and the desires of the public at large where the rights violated are so important that to 
allow continued violation would mean inescapable oversight by the court. The follow-on 
from this is none other than that despite the contentious position within the separation of 
powers of an argument for decriminalizing cannabis, the reality may well be that in 
heightened deference to the separation of powers and public opinion, the court may 
nonetheless find itself permitting continued human rights abuses in the name of a 
prohibition whose purpose may be as futile as the stated purpose was in Makwanyane 
regarding the death penalty. This argument will be balanced against the separation of 
powers doctrine as part of the weighting exercise the court performs in assessing what 
remedial action to take. 
I now move on to consider whether the implicated right to equality has in fact been 
infringed by the legislative scheme. 
4.3 THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY: SECTION 9 OF THE CONSTITUTION 
4.3.1 OVERVIEW OF THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY: STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK AND 
INTERPRETATION 
The South African Constitution is based on the fundamental rights of equality, dignity 
and freedom.90 Bearing in mind the historical and social context of South Africa, emanating 
from a system of apartheid, it is submitted that the value of dignity is pervasive throughout 
the Bill of Rights, but is pronouncedly more so regarding the right to equality in section 9 of 
the Constitution. The fundamental right to equality purports that the law will protect and 
benefit people equally, and there is an obligation on the State to ensure equal protection 
and benefit under the law, as explicitly stated in section 1(a) of the Constitution. 
The framework of section 9 divides the right into three main constituent parts when 
it comes to challenging conduct or law or infringement of the section. These constituent 
parts are, briefly, section 9(1) which deals with differentiation, section 9(2) which relates to 
redistributive measures, and section 9(3) which deals specifically with discrimination on 
                                                          
90 I Currie & J De Waal ‘The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th Edition’ 2005 Juta&Co Ltd at p231. 
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listed and analogous grounds.91 Regarding structure and content, the equality provision has 
similarities to the Canadian equality provision92, however the Constitutional Court has 
stated that the right to equality in section 9 is worded differently than in other 
constitutions, these differences being reflective of differing historical contexts of the nations 
and their different jurisprudential and philosophical notions of equality.93 Given these 
differences, ‘Interpretations of the equality clause of the South African Constitution must 
therefore be based on the wording of the right within the constitutional context and 
cognisance must be taken of our history.’94 As discussed in Chapter 1.2, South Africa’s 
history of cannabis prohibition is one which was predicated mainly on racist and pseudo-
psychological attitudes. Set against this contextual background, section 9 must be 
interrogated with this fact of our history firmly at the forefront of consideration.  
The equality provision does not preclude classifications or differentiations by the 
State, as it is understood that legitimate reasons do sometimes exist for differentiations and 
                                                          
91 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 ss9(1), 9(2) and 9(3):  
           9.  (1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.  
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.  
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.  
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds 
in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair 
discrimination. 
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is 
established that the discrimination is fair. 
92 Section 15 (1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982 provides: ‘Every individual is equal before and under the law 
and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, 
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical 
disability.’ 
93 Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) at 216. 
94 K Govender ‘Equality and Social Justice: Equality - the South African Perspective’ Discussion document. 




classifications95, however, ‘whilst the government may legitimately make classifications, it 
can only classify people into different groups and afford different treatment to the different 
groups if the criteria upon which the classifications are based are permissible.’96 
Permissibility in turn depends upon the purpose of the differentiation and upon the 
existence of a satisfactory link between the criteria used to differentiate, and the State 
objectives which are purportedly served by the differentiation.97   With respect to mere 
differentiation the State must act in a rational manner, and its laws must equally be rational. 
Regulation by the State ought not to be done in an arbitrary manner, and must not reveal 
'naked preferences' that serve no legitimate governmental purpose.98 ‘Naked preference’ 
which is arbitrary would be inconsistent with the rule of law and the fundamental values of 
a constitutional democracy. Section 9’s purpose is thus to ensure that the State is bound by 
a standard of rationality, and therefore:  
‘…[b]efore it can be said that mere differentiation infringes [section 9] it must be 
established that there is no rational relationship between the differentiation in 
question and the government purpose which is proffered to validate it. In the 
absence of such rational relationship the differentiation would infringe [section 9].’99 
Further to this, the justification for reviewing state law or conduct against a standard 
of rationality is sourced elsewhere in the Constitution other than section 9. Section 1(c) of 
the Constitution, one of the founding provisions, has been utilised by the Constitutional 
Court to formulate reviews of legislative and executive action on the basis of rationality. 
One such case was that of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers.100 The President had signed a bill 
into law without the requisite accompanying regulations, and the court invalidated this 
action on the grounds that, despite being executive action, such conduct could not be said 
                                                          
95 P Hogg ‘Constitutional Law of Canada’ 2010 Carswell at 52.6. 
96 Op cit note 94. 
97 Prinsloo v Van Der Linde and Another 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC). 
98 Supra note 73. 
99 Op cit note 94. 
100 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re: ex parte President of the Republic of South 
Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC).  
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to be rational. Another example was the case of Democratic Alliance v President of South 
Africa and Others101 where the court invalidated President Zuma’s decision to appoint 
Menzi Simelane as National Director of Public Prosecutions on the grounds that the 
President, in ignoring evidence of dishonesty by Simelane, had failed to apply his mind to 
the question of whether Simelane was a ‘fit and proper person’ for appointment. Such a 
decision accordingly was held by the court to be irrational. The framework of section 9, and 
a test for its application have been canvassed in the Constitutional Court in great detail in 
the case of Harksen v Lane102 (‘Harksen’), and the current challenge would require that the 
Harksen test be applied to the conduct and law of the State regarding the prohibition of 
cannabis.  
4.3.2 ASSESSING INFRINGEMENT: THE HARKSEN TEST AND THE STANDARD OF 
RATIONALITY IN SECTION 9(1) 
4.3.2.1 HARKSEN V LANE AND OTHER RELATED CASES ON EQUALITY 
Harksen established the necessary stages of enquiry in order to establish whether 
section 9 has been infringed. The judgment was decided according to the Interim 
Constitution section 8, which was the formulation of the equality clause before the 
enactment of the Final Constitution, in which equality occupies section 9. The test, 
established for application of section 8 of the Interim Constitution, still finds application in 
the interpretation and analysis of section 9 of the Final Constitution.  Mrs Harksen 
challenged the constitutional validity of relevant provisions of the Insolvency Act which 
caused her property to vest in the Master of the High Court.103 The argument was that the 
Act placed excessively onerous burdens on the solvent spouse compared to the position of 
others in intimate relationships with the insolvent.104 In reasoning toward the decision that 
the burdens were not too onerous, due to the necessary protection they afforded 
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creditors105, the court had to formulate a manner of testing conduct and law against section 
9. This test has become known as the ‘Harksen test’, and it is this test which will be applied 
to a challenge to the cannabis prohibition. Goldstone J for the court, formulated the test 
regarding the equality right as follows: 
‘(a)  Does the provision differentiate between people or categories of people? If so, does 
the differentiation bear a rational connection to a legitimate government purpose? If 
it does not then there is a violation of s 8(1). Even if it does bear a rational 
connection, it might nevertheless amount to discrimination’106 
The test goes on to stipulate that, if the threshold test of rationality is satisfied, and 
there is a rational connection between a legitimate state purpose and the differentiation 
(the means used to achieve the purpose), the court will then proceed to the next stage of 
the enquiry into whether there has been discrimination under section 9(3).107 The 
formulation of the Harksen test was ‘the culmination of the Constitutional Court’s evolving 
equality jurisprudence’108 which had already been developed in a line of cases including 
Prinsloo v Van der Linde109. In Prinsloo, under the Forest Act 122 of 1984 ‘a presumption of 
negligence arises when a claim for damages is instituted against a defendant for damages 
caused by a fire outside a fire control area as determined in terms of the Act. Prinsloo 
alleged that the statutory presumption discriminated unfairly against defendants in actions 
such as these when compared to other delictual matters where the burden of proof is on 
the plaintiff’.110 The court, during its reasoning, expressed the need for development of 
South Africa’s equality jurisprudence, with careful consideration of international and foreign 
law in working this development.111  
                                                          
105 Op cit note 73. 
106 Op cit note 73 at para 54. 
107 Op cit note 73 at para 54. 
108 Op cit note 103 at p482. 
109 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC). 
110 Op cit note 103 at p482 note 11. 
111 Op cit note 97 at paras 18-20. 
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Differentiation was held by the majority to be ‘at the heart of equality jurisprudence 
in general and… the section 8 right in particular’112. As with the final Constitution section 9, 
the Interim Constitution section 8 distinguished between differentiation that amounts to 
unfair discrimination and differentiation that is not unfair discrimination.113 This distinction 
exists because some differentiation is necessary in any society, provided the differentiation 
is rational, non-arbitrary and does not manifest ‘naked preferences’114. Rationality analysis 
is the foundation of the application of the equality provision precisely because it asks, with 
respect to an enquiry involving such ‘mere differentiation’115, whether in fact a rational 
connection exists between the State purpose to be achieved through the differentiation, 
and the differentiation itself.116  Kruger, citing the court in National Coalition117 states that  
‘…[s] 9(1) ensures equal treatment of all persons in conferring benefits and imposing 
restraints on people…Where differential treatment is allowed, such treatment has to 
be rationally connected to a legitimate governmental purpose. With the formulation 
of the Harksen test, the rationality analysis became a standard threshold test in 
matters concerning equality… Rationally justifiable differentiation, termed ‘mere 
differentiation’, is acceptable in an open and democratic society.’118 
The court explored the nature of the rationality enquiry in the case of Jooste v Score 
Supermarket119 and reasoned that the test is neutral in nature. It focuses purely on whether 
the differentiation is rationally grounded, rather than questioning whether it is fair, as is the 
enquiry under the discrimination enquiry in s 9(3): 
‘It is clear that the only purpose of rationality review is an inquiry into whether the 
differentiation is arbitrary or irrational, or manifests naked preference and it is 
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irrelevant to this enquiry whether the scheme chosen by the Legislature could be 
improved in one respect or another.’120 
In this sense, the argument posited earlier in this Chapter, that the separation of 
powers should not weigh heavily at this stage of the enquiry, holds true if the court in Jooste 
was correct in its above stipulation. It also clearly shows that what is in issue, is not whether 
the differentiation could achieve the purpose if employed another way, rather the issue is 
whether the differentiation is arbitrary or indicative of ‘naked preference’ at the time the 
court hears the matter. The question is whether the court is obliged to traverse the entirety 
of the Harksen test on a finding of irrationality, or does it have a discretion to abandon the 
rest of the test, particularly where the litigant declines to supply argument on the matter?  
Regarding the current challenge, it is clear that at least a large part of the 
differentiation is between classes of people who use cannabis, and those who use alcohol 
and tobacco. It is unclear however, whether there is any ground on which argument could 
be made on the basis of section 9(3), given that the listed grounds on which discrimination 
will be presumed unfair do not include choice of substance use or the equivalent ground.121 
Additionally, the test for an analogous ground of discrimination which is unfair, requires that 
the differentiation be in respect of an immutable characteristic which severely impacts upon 
a person’s dignity.122 The only listed ground under which the challenge could be made 
would be the ground of religion or belief. Given the lack of success in Prince of a similar 
argument, and given that the aim of this challenge would be to remove the prohibition on 
cannabis for the benefit of the entire population, an argument on the basis of religion would 
not be at all appropriate. 
 It is submitted that, this being the case, the court should not feel obliged to pursue 
the rest of the Harksen test per section 9(3), and that a litigant would have little success in 
                                                          
120 Jooste v Score Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd (Minister of Labour intervening) 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) at para 17. 
121 Constitution s 9(3). 
122 Hoffmann v South African Airways 2000 (11) BCLR 1211 (CC) para 40. The court does not explicitly mention 
the analogous ground enquiry, but assumes that HIV status naturally occupies the same status as listed 
grounds in s9(3). It does this because it did not wish to allow HIV to be regarded as a ‘disability’ which was the 
listed ground the challenge was brought under. The court decided in favour of unfairness because of the 
impact the discrimination had upon Hoffmann’s dignity. 
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arguing the matter on these grounds. Further, if a litigant is unsuccessful in proving the 
prohibition irrational under the first stage of the Harksen test, he ought not to pursue the 
matter under section 9(3), but should proceed to interrogating the other rights implicated 
(which are not the subject of this dissertation).   
The Harksen rationality test forms the starting point and foundation for any enquiry 
involving the right to equality in section 9 of the Constitution. The State would likely claim 
that it has a legitimate purpose in prohibiting cannabis, and would further argue that there 
is a rational connection between that purpose, and the differentiation it exercises between 
users of cannabis and users of alcohol and tobacco. The focus of the application of the 
Harksen test in this instance is therefore to interrogate two things: firstly, it should 
interrogate whether the State’s purpose is legitimate; secondly it should interrogate 
whether there is a rational connection between the State’s purpose and the means it uses 
to achieve it (the differentiation between users of cannabis and users of alcohol and 
tobacco). In order to properly apply the Harksen test in this manner, an analysis must be 
conducted into the separate stages of this enquiry. It must be examined what exactly the 
court has meant by ‘legitimate government purpose’, in its jurisprudence, and what 
requirements (if any) the court has stipulated exist to ground a rational connection between 
government purpose and differentiation it employs.  
4.3.2.2 THE INTERPRETATION OF A ‘LEGITIMATE STATE PURPOSE’. 
As discussed above, the enquiry under the Harksen test requires that there be a 
rational connection between a legitimate state purpose, and the differentiation which the 
State employs to give effect to that purpose. To reiterate the full question the enquiry 
examines, per Harksen: 
‘(a)  Does the provision differentiate between people or categories of people? If so, does 
the differentiation bear a rational connection to a legitimate government purpose? If 
it does not then there is a violation of s 8(1). Even if it does bear a rational 
connection, it might nevertheless amount to discrimination’123 
                                                          
123 Supra note 73 at para 54. 
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The rationality test therefore examines two crucial aspects of the differentiation, 
once it has been established that differentiation exists. It is trite that the State’s 
legislative scheme differentiates between people or categories of people. This is so because 
while the legislative scheme lists cannabis as a prohibited substance, thereby criminalising 
the conduct of cannabis users, it does not list alcohol or tobacco as prohibited substances, 
and therefore does not prohibit or criminalise the conduct of users of alcohol and tobacco. 
The first component of the rationality test is to examine whether the government’s purpose 
in effecting the differentiation is legitimate. I submit that this component requires 
consideration not just with respect to whether the purpose is subjectively legitimate, but 
whether objectively, the purpose is legitimate. It is further submitted that objective 
legitimacy requires more than a surface-level examination of whether the State in fact has a 
purpose for the differentiation.  
It arguably requires that the court interrogate several things: firstly, the court ought 
to interrogate whether the purpose as expressed by the state has as its basis some wrong or 
harm which it seeks to prevent – the reverse is true also, and the court should consider 
whether the basis of the purpose is genuinely the public good; secondly, the court should 
assess whether, objectively, there is some unexpressed possible purpose which underlies 
the differentiation, and whether these possibilities are also capable of being legitimate. A 
component of the enquiry into the State’s expressed purpose ought to be whether the harm 
or wrong which the State seeks to prevent –  through the differentiation –  is in fact a ‘harm’ 
or ‘wrong’, objectively speaking. If there is no existing wrong or harm, or if, comparatively, 
the harm is no greater than that posed by other similar substances which have not been 
prohibited, then the government purpose arguably cannot be legitimate.  
To interrogate the legitimacy of the purpose in the manner I have just outlined, is to 
go a step further than courts have gone in rationality analysis in contemporary 
Constitutional Court jurisprudence. It does not merely involve the court examining a list of 
reasons provided by the State to justify its purpose, and finding legitimacy based on the 
mere act of affording reasons.124 The enquiry, which I submit as the correct one in this 
                                                          
124 Law Society of South Africa and Others v Minister of Transport and Others 2010 Case no: CCT 38/10 First 
and Third to Eleventh Applicants’ Heads of Argument p14 paras 26 and 27. 
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instance, is in fact a specimen of rationality review which section 9 contemplates, even if the 
court has not effectively applied it up until now. The same question was examined in the 
Heads of Argument supplied for the case of Law Society of South Africa and Others v 
Minister of Transport and Another125, and the judgment which followed therefrom. The first, 
and third to eleventh applicants, argued that the rationality test’s proper construction 
originated from the work of Thayer126, and merited consideration of more than whether the 
government could provide reasons for the purpose in order to ground a finding by the court 
that such purpose is legitimate. They argued that: 
‘His test requires courts to determine whether there exists a rational connection 
between the means envisaged in an enactment and a legitimate purpose sought to 
be attained by that enactment. The requirement of rationality in turn holds that the 
legislative measure must not discriminate arbitrarily or unfairly deprive people of 
constitutional protection.’127 
They argued this aspect because typically, a court considering the legitimacy of a 
government purpose may find itself unsatisfied with the justifiability of the reasons the 
State affords to convince the court of the legislative purpose’s legitimacy, but will still feel 
bound to pronounce the purpose legitimate (and the differentiation rational) due to the 
State having provided a list of reasons to this effect.128 In this challenge, the same concern 
must be addressed. The proper way to achieve a finding of irrationality is to indeed argue 
that the State’s reasons which purport to legitimise its purpose, in fact do not do so, either 
because they are not objectively good reasons, or are not supported by external 
evidence.129 Taking this further, the applicants submitted that: 
                                                          
125 2011 (2) BCLR 150 (CC). 
126 Thayer in ‘The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law’ (1893) 7 Harvard Law 
Review 129. Cited in Law Society of South Africa op cit note 124 p14. 
127 Op cit note 124 paras 26 and 27. 
128 Op cit note 124 para 25. 
129 It was submitted that ‘…the factual basis on which the impugned legislation is sought to be rationalised 
should be interrogated judicially.’ Op cit note 124 p14 at para 26. 
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‘…the rationality inquiry cannot properly be limited to inquiring whether there are 
“naked preferences”… Accordingly, the standard test as expressed by Thayer 
involves – in circumstances where a scheme categorically drops a guillotine on 
constitutional rights… that the court inquire into whether the measure “unfairly 
deprives people of constitutional protection”… Accordingly, the true rationality test 
does not lead to declarations of constitutional validity where the scheme is 
“substantively unjust”… It involves an evaluation of the reasons, lest the principle 
of legality should suffer by putting form over substance or the quantity of reasons 
over the quality of the reasoning. While the test is not one of proportionality, of 
course, the approach cannot be reduced to a counting of straws…’130 [Emphasis 
added] 
The applicants further supplied an argument as to how the court ought to apply the 
test for a legitimate government purpose, arguing that, ‘…A court should deal with the 
evidence and in the light thereof evaluate the bases on which the impugned provision is 
sought to be justified. It cannot merely table them without evaluation.’131 Lenta has 
reflected on the duty of judges in South Africa to balance the conflicting needs of upholding 
individual rights while appropriately affording deference to policy decisions by other arms of 
government.132 He noted that placing emphasis on ‘one [need] at the expense of the other 
is to neglect an important aspect of the judicial function.’133 Lenta acknowledged that the 
approach ought to be developed casuistically, and he considered that the conflict of needs 
envisioned in rationality review ‘can be reconciled at a certain level of abstraction and 
generality in the following principle: The judiciary should allow the legislature and the 
executive the maximum feasible room to develop policy limited only by the requirement 
that it protect individual’s rights.’ 134 [Emphasis added].  
                                                          
130 Op cit note 124 pp15-16 paras 29-30. 
131 Op cit note 124 p17 para 32. 
132 P Lenta ‘Judicial Restraint and Overreach’ (2004) SAJHR 544 at 575-576. 
133 Ibid at 575-576 discussing Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2001 (2) SA 388 (CC) at para 156. 
134 Ibid at p576. 
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To apply the construction of the rationality test in section 9, based on Thayer’s work, 
as suggested in the Heads of Argument for the Law Society case, therefore should not be 
considered as an overreach by the court of its judicial function. Again, reiterating the 
argument regarding the separation of powers in this Chapter, this consideration ought not 
to deter the court at this stage of the rights violation enquiry, from concluding that a proper 
construction of the rationality test necessarily involves evaluating the reasons which the 
government supplies to legitimise its purpose, and testing these reasons against objective 
evidence.  
Moseneke DCJ for the Constitutional Court, had to address these very arguments in 
the case of Law Society and Others v Minister of Transport and Another135. His account of 
the above arguments was the following: 
‘…“the true rationality test”, applicants contend, does not lead to declarations of 
constitutional validity where the scheme is “substantively unjust”. And the scheme‘s 
substantive justness involves more than the “counting of straws” – more than 
merely listing, as the Minister has done in this case, reasons for adopting the 
scheme. Whilst the test is not one of proportionality, a court must evaluate the 
reasons, lest the principle of legality, as they put it, “should suffer by putting form 
over substance or the quantity of reasons over the quality of the reasoning”. Thus in 
evaluating the rationale for a chosen policy, goes the argument, the court must 
engage with the evidence as in all disputes; it must evaluate the bases on which the 
impugned provision is sought to be justified as rational.’136 
He went on to recount the formulation of the rationality test according to the 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, and restated that the test concerns the existence 
of a rational nexus between a legitimate purpose and the means used to achieve it 
(differentiation in this challenge).137 Regarding the argument that this should include the 
assessment of the government’s reasons provided to legitimise its purpose for 
differentiation, Moseneke DCJ stated the following: 
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136 Supra at para 30. 
137 Supra at para 32. 
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‘A decision whether a legislative provision or scheme is rationally related to a given 
governmental object entails an objective enquiry…It is by now well settled that 
where a legislative measure is challenged on the ground that it is not rational, the 
court must examine the means chosen in order to decide whether they are rationally 
related to the public good sought to be achieved…It remains to be said that the 
requirement of rationality is not directed at testing whether legislation is fair or 
reasonable or appropriate…Its use is restricted to the threshold question whether 
the measure the lawgiver has chosen is properly related to the public good it seeks 
to realise.’138 
At this stage it is useful to note that Moseneke DCJ eventually finds against the 
applicants, but what is pertinent in the paragraphs quoted above, is that Moseneke DCJ 
confirms the objective nature of the rationality enquiry. In stating also that ‘…the court must 
examine the means chosen in order to decide whether they are rationally related to the 
public good sought to be achieved’139, Moseneke also confirms the submission that the 
legitimacy of the government purpose must depend on some public good which the State is 
attempting to achieve. Another aspect of interest to the submissions in this part, is that 
Moseneke does not completely invalidate the argument that the legitimacy of the 
government’s purpose ought to be tested with reference to objective evidence, rather he 
states that ‘…the requirement of rationality is not directed at testing whether legislation is 
fair or reasonable or appropriate…’140. He goes on to decline to apply the applicants’ 
construction of the rationality test, stating that: 
‘…It is accordingly unnecessary to deploy the rationality standard to provide 
constitutional protection which section 36 already provides… The applicants further 
urged us to incorporate fairness as an element of rationality. Again, the applicants 
conflate the rationality and proportionality standards of review. I have already 
remarked that fairness is not a requirement in the rationality enquiry. If the 
substance of the complaint is about the deprivation of fundamental rights, it would 
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139 Supra at paras 33-35. 
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be subject to the proportionality requirements of section 36 and not of mere 
rationality.’141 
What distinguishes the submissions in this part of the dissertation from the 
submissions the applicants made in this case (and which Moseneke declined to accept) is 
that the  proposed submissions in this dissertation do not at all entail a conflation of the 
proportionality test in section 36 with the rationality standard in section 9. The submission 
is merely that, when afforded reasons which the State believes support the legitimacy of its 
purpose, the court ought to not merely ‘rubber stamp’ these reasons, but ought in fact to 
examine objective evidence, and on the basis of that examination, decide whether the 
reasons the State provides actually support legitimacy of purpose on a factual (not 
proportional) basis. The court ought to examine whether there is in fact an objective ‘public 
good’ sought to be achieved, and should then examine whether the purposes connected 
with that public good are legitimate when weighed against objective evidence. Moseneke 
remains silent regarding his view of the applicants’ contention that such an examination is 
really an aspect of the rationality test which governs all public conduct, policy and 
legislation, and therefore does not remove this possibility. This being so, the submission 
regarding this aspect of the rationality test is not disturbed by Moseneke’s reasoning in this 
case.  
There is therefore no insurmountable jurisprudential bar to this suggested 
formulation of the ‘legitimate government’ purpose’ aspect of the rationality test. When the 
court considers the rationality of the legislative scheme which prohibits cannabis use, there 
should be no reason why an applicant could not succeed in arguing for this construction of 
this aspect of the rationality test. This being the case, the applicant could then move on to 
argue that, based on objective evidence, the reasons afforded by the government for its 
prohibition of cannabis do not in fact make its purpose legitimate. The next phase of 
argument would then naturally be to examine what the courts require in order to hold that 
there is a ‘rational connection’ between the purpose and the differentiation. 
 The following part of this Chapter will address the application of the ‘legitimate 
government purpose’ aspect of rationality, and will comprise an assessment of the purposes 
                                                          
141 Supra at paras 38-39. 
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which the State advanced in Prince to justify its blanket prohibition under the limitations 
analysis. As will become apparent later in this Chapter, and in Chapter 5, it is acceptable to 
transplant the State’s purposes for the prohibition from Prince into the rationality enquiry 
under section 9. This is because, should the court decide that the scheme is rational, the 
applicant’s case would fail at the first hurdle, after which (as stated above) he would be well 
advised to proceed to argument on other rights. On the other hand, should the court decide 
that the scheme is irrational, there would in fact be no need to proceed to a limitations 
analysis. In support of this contention, I consider again the findings of Moseneke DCJ in Law 
Society, in which he held the following: 
‘It is significant that one of the relevant factors listed in section 36 is the “relation 
between the limitation and its purpose”. This is so because the requirement of 
rationality is indeed a logical part of the proportionality test. It is self-evident that a 
measure which is irrational could hardly pass muster as reasonable and justifiable 
for purposes of restricting a fundamental right…’ [Emphasis added]142 
Given Moseneke’s reasoning, if the applicant can prove that the State does not have 
a legitimate purpose in prohibiting cannabis use, while not prohibiting use of alcohol or 
tobacco, the rationality test will fail ab initio and there would accordingly be no need to 
even consider the rational connection test. For the purposes of this dissertation, I will still 
consider the rational connection test, despite my prima facie view that the State cannot, 
and does not, have a legitimate purpose for prohibiting cannabis use while not prohibiting 
alcohol or tobacco use. I will also not be considering the limitations analysis for the reasons 
supplied, namely, that I believe the proper construction of the rationality test would lead to 
a finding of irrationality. This being the case, as Moseneke himself stated ‘…a measure which 
is irrational could hardly pass muster as reasonable and justifiable for purposes of restricting 
a fundamental right…’143  Therefore, there could not be any need to proceed to a limitations 
analysis irrespective of the court’s finding on rationality.   
Further to this, it is submitted that the arguments advanced in Chapter 5, regarding 
the legitimacy of the government purpose behind prohibiting cannabis use, illustrate the 
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close link between the ‘legitimate government purpose’ inquiry and the ‘rational 
connection’ inquiry. Particularly regarding this challenge, the interrelatedness of these 
inquiries means that both may be addressed with reference to the same arguments. If the 
purposes behind the prohibition are not legitimate, there can be no rational connection 
inquiry. Even on the assumption that there would be a finding of legitimacy of purpose 
under the construction of the rationality test advanced in this Chapter, the evidence and 
facts which would be employed at this stage, would likely also prove a rational connection.  
5. APPLICATION OF THE SECTION 9 (1) RATIONALITY ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 THE LEGISLATIVE SCHEME REVISITED 
 
Chapter 4 above has shown that an extended construction of the rationality test is 
appropriate when dealing with challenges to legislation under section 9(1). This extended 
construction is nothing novel in our law, but has already been expressly, alternatively tacitly 
approved, so I submit, by Mosoneke DCJ in Minister of Transport. Further, the construction 
of the rationality analysis I put forward does not conflate rationality and reasonableness 
(reasonableness in the sense of the section 36 limitations analysis), but merely requires 
more of the State when it claims that its purpose behind the challenged legislation is 
legitimate. It asks more than that the purposes be permissible at a base level. It asks 
whether there is in fact evidence to support the legitimacy of the purpose behind the 
legislation. Asking for evidence to support legitimacy is not the same as asking for a 
proportional outcome. Proportionality pertains to reasonableness, but evidence of 
legitimacy merely requires that the court not ‘rubber stamp’ the State’s given purposes. It 
requires that the court do more than to merely ask whether the purpose could conceivably 
be legitimate. With this in mind, I now move on to apply the test for a legitimate State 
purpose, through reference to the legislative scheme, and to assess objective evidence 
against which the legitimacy of the State’s assumed purposes ought to be tested. 
The challenge would, in full, comprise an attack on the validity of section 40(h) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act144 in so far as it relates to arrests for possession, consumption and 
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transportation of cannabis for personal use. In addition, under attack for constitutional 
invalidity would be section 4, read with Part 3 of Schedule 2 of the Drug and Drug Trafficking 
Act145, and section 22A read with Schedule 8 of the Medicines and Related Substances 
Act146 with regards to possession and use of cannabis respectively. It is necessary to conduct 
a thorough examination of the relevant provisions, because they are the means through 
which the State differentiates between users of cannabis on the one hand, and users of 
alcohol and tobacco on the other.   
Section 1 of the Drug and Drug Trafficking Act (‘Drug Act’), supplies the following 
relevant definitions:  
‘(1) In this Act, unless the context indicates otherwise— 
“dependence-producing substance” means any substance or any plant from 
which a substance can be manufactured included in Part I of Schedule 2; 
… 
“drug” means any dependence-producing substance, any dangerous 
dependence-producing substance or any undesirable dependence-producing 
substance; 
… 
“possess”, in relation to a drug, includes to keep or to store the drug, or to 
have it in custody or under control or supervision; 
… 
“drug offence”—  
(a) in relation to a drug offence committed in the Republic, means an offence 
referred to in section 13 (a) - ( f );  
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(b) in relation to a drug offence committed outside the Republic, means any 
act or omission which, if it had occurred within the Republic, would have 
constituted an offence referred to in that section; 
… 
“undesirable dependence-producing substance” means any substance or any 
plant from which a substance can be manufactured included in Part III of 
Schedule 2. 
Cannabis is listed in Part III of Schedule 2 of the Drug Act, which classifies it as an 
‘undesirable dependence-producing substance’. The definitions section of the act further 
classifies any undesirable dependence-producing substance as a ‘drug’ for the purposes of 
the act. This classification is the first component of the prohibition contained in the 
legislative scheme. The second component, which actually creates the offence, is the 
definition of ‘drug offence’, which, read with section 4147 and section 13148 of that Act, 
effectively criminalises possession of cannabis (see above for the definition of ‘possession’). 
Section 17 of the Drug Act creates the penalties which follow from convictions on the basis 
                                                          
147 Drug and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992 s 4 reads as follows: 
Use and possession of drugs.—No person shall use or have in his possession— 
(a) any dependence-producing substance; or  
(b) any dangerous dependence-producing substance or any undesirable dependence-producing 
substance, 
148 Drug and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992 s 13 (f) reads as follows: 
Offences relating to scheduled substances and drugs—Any person who— 
(a) places any drug in the possession, or in or on the premises, vehicle, vessel or aircraft, of any other 
person with intent that the latter person be charged with an offence under this Act; 
 (b) contravenes a provision of section 3; 
 (c) contravenes a provision of section 4 (a);  
(d) contravenes a provision of section 4 (b); 
 (e) contravenes a provision of section 5 (a); or 
 ( f ) contravenes a provision of section 5 (b),  
shall be guilty of an offence. 
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of this act.149 Section 40(h) of the Criminal Procedure Act (‘CPA’) provides for the arrest of 
any person, without a warrant, who is suspected of having committed an offence relating to 
the possession of drugs.150 The Medicines Act reinforces the prohibition as it relates to the 
Medical profession.  
This is the legislative scheme which, through these various provisions, prohibits the 
use of cannabis. The substances alcohol and tobacco have not been listed in any manner 
which would cause their possession to be a criminal offence, as these substances are 
permitted for use, and are consequently regulated by the legislature through their own 
respective Acts of Parliament.151 This is the heart of the differentiation. Cannabis is listed as 
a drug whose possession is an offence – the legislative scheme expressly makes it so. 
Alcohol and tobacco are regulated through legislation. The only offence committed for 
possession and use of those substances beyond the scope of the respective acts, would thus 
be a regulatory one as opposed to one which carries a greater sentence, and greater 
criminal sanction. The issue that must now be examined is whether the State’s assumed 
                                                          
149 Drug and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992 s 17: 
Penalties.—Any person who is convicted of an offence under this Act shall be liable— 
(b) in the case of an offence referred to in section 13 (a) or (c), to such fine as the court may deem fit 
to impose, or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, or to both such fine and such 
imprisonment;  
(c) in the case of an offence referred to in section 13 (e), to such fine as the court may deem fit to 
impose, or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years, or to both such fine and such 
imprisonment; 
 (d) in the case of an offence referred to in section 13 (b) or (d), 14 or 15, to such fine as the court may 
deem fit to impose, or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 15 years, or to both such fine and 
such imprisonment; and  
(e) in the case of an offence referred to in section 13 ( f ), to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
25 years, or to both such imprisonment and such fine as the court may deem fit to impose. 
150 Criminal procedure Act, 51 of 1977 s 40: 
Arrest by peace officer without warrant  
(1) A peace officer may without warrant arrest any person- 
(h) who is reasonably suspected of committing or of having committed an offence under any law 
governing the making, supply, possession or conveyance of intoxicating liquor or of dependence-
producing drugs or the possession or disposal of arms or ammunition; 
151  Liquor Act 59 of 2003; Tobacco Products Control Act 83 of 1993 respectively. 
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purposes for prohibiting cannabis use and possession in the manner it chose to do so, are 
legitimate. This will involve an exploration of the State’s assumed purposes and 
accompanying reasons or evidence, and the testing of the assumed purposes against this 
evidence in order to come to a conclusion as to the legitimacy of these purposes. 
Moseneke DCJ’s linking of the rationality enquiry to the enquiry regarding the 
importance of the purpose in the section 36 limitations analysis in Law Society v Minister of 
Transport152 allows room for an assumption regarding  the State’s purposes, based on the 
arguments in Prince as well as the Committee hearing which followed his case. This is 
because Moseneke reasoned that rationality is a pertinent factor in the leg of the limitations 
test which considers the relation between the limitation and its purpose, and that 
accordingly, there are similarities between the rationality enquiry as to legitimacy of 
purpose, and this leg of the limitations analysis.153 This being so, I have drawn three implied 
purposes from the arguments in Prince and the committee meetings which the State used 
to justify its limitation of Prince’s right to religion. It is, I submit, appropriate to imply these 
purposes and to make use of them in application within this context of the rationality 
enquiry, due to the reasoning of Mosoneke DCJ in Law Society v Minister of Transport154.  
Mosoneke DCJ drew attention to the similarity between ‘legitimate purpose’ leg of 
the rationality enquiry, and the leg of the limitations analysis test which examines the link 
between the limitation and its purpose. This similarity then permits the application of the 
extended form of the legitimate purpose leg of the rationality enquiry, through the use of 
the implied purposes which the State used to justify the limitation in Prince (in application of 
the ‘limitation and the relation to its purpose’ leg of the limitations analysis). These assumed 
purposes may be stated as follows: Prevention of the ‘Harm’ or ‘Wrong’ which cannabis 
introduces to society; and the need to fulfil obligations in terms of international law.155 
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155 Prince supra note 2 at paras 52-53; para 114; para 72 (international law obligations). 
59 
K KOWALSKI 
5.2 IS THERE A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT PURPOSE? 
5.2.1 THE NEED FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A GREATER HARM ASSOCIATED WITH 
CANNABIS TO SUPPORT A LEGITIMATE PURPOSE FOR 
DIFFERENTIATION. 
 
 As stated immediately above, one purpose which the State claims is achieved 
through its differentiation, is the prevention of the greater comparative harm which 
cannabis poses, as opposed to the harm caused by alcohol and tobacco. Evidently, by 
choosing to prohibit cannabis, and merely to regulate the sale and use of alcohol and 
tobacco, the State is unequivocally supporting the notion that cannabis causes more harm 
than alcohol or tobacco. This is so, because the only thing which can objectively 
differentiate these substances regarding the State’s chosen control methods, is the level of 
sanction which the State attaches to each respective substance. Indeed, by classifying 
cannabis as an ‘undesirable dependence-producing substance’, but omitting to similarly 
classify alcohol and tobacco, the State in its own law declares that cannabis is considered by 
it to be the more harmful substance, worthy of prohibiting in order to prevent that greater 
harm from affecting the population.  
By comparing cannabis with alcohol and tobacco, the similarities and differences in 
levels of relative harm can be assessed, in order to establish whether the differences 
warrant the differentiation which is achieved through prohibition, and ultimately, whether 
the harm prevention is a legitimate government purpose. It is undeniable that all 
recreational substances (for example, alcohol, tobacco and cannabis alike) cause harm of 
some kind. Therefore, if the government purpose is to combat harm in the public interest, it 
is not difficult to imagine that this purpose could pass as legitimate when viewed in 
isolation.  
The issue arises when there are, for example, three substances which all objectively 
cause harm, yet the State chooses to only prohibit one of them. The government purpose of 
preventing harm in the public interest thus loses legitimacy where it chooses to prohibit one 
of the harm-causing substances, but fails to do so in respect of the others. Viewed 
differently, the purpose loses legitimacy where the State allows certain harmful substances 
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to be freely consumed (subject to regulation), but prohibits one which, objectively, is no 
more of a menace to society than those which are not prohibited. It is unnecessary to prove 
that cannabis is harmless. The condonation of tobacco and alcohol consumption by the 
State indicates that a boundary has already been demarcated, indicating the level of harm 
which the State considers to be acceptable. If the purpose is to protect society from a 
greater social ‘wrong’ or ‘harm’, where the actual harm is no greater than that of permitted 
substances, the purpose cannot be considered legitimate. 
At this point, the history of the cannabis prohibition in South Africa and other former 
British Colonies must be recalled, as this history (discussed in Chapter I) entirely defined the 
stigma which has attached to cannabis, and has created the adverse perception which led to 
its ultimate prohibition. I submitted in Chapter I, the following conclusion regarding the 
ignominious history of cannabis prohibition as it relates to the current legislative 
prohibition:  
‘This violation is exacerbated by the very history of racialized politics, psychology and 
criminology which led to the current prohibition… cannabis is prohibited, while other 
substances (like alcohol and tobacco) which also had a flourishing early trade and 
culture of consumption, are permissible… cannabis was likely only treated differently 
owing to early inaccurate pseudo-psychological and criminological attitudes…’156 
This conclusion regarding the original purpose of the cannabis prohibition in South 
Africa, is supported by Paterson’s work (also discussed in Chapter I) in which he states, 
regarding the origins of the strict prohibition of cannabis: 
‘…cannabis use was not a political issue until such a time as the ‘non-white’ 
population came into great enough contact with the politically dominant ‘white’ 
population to make this contact seem like a threat that needed to be reduced. 
Cannabis use was not a problem unless there was great enough contact between the 
‘white’ colonists and the cannabis-using ‘non-white’ population, and, in this sense, 
cannabis laws may be located in the greater schema of the so-called ‘grand 
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apartheid’ design. At the very least, both cannabis law and apartheid law rest on the 
same ideological foundation.’157 
It becomes obvious then, that the origin of the so-called greater ‘harm’ or ‘wrong’ 
which the State insists cannabis poses to society, may amount to nothing more than 
incorrect perception which has become ingrained over decades of prohibition. This 
ingrained perception is also predicated upon the same thinking which made acceptable the 
death penalty, the criminalisation of non-heterosexual relationships, harsh immigration law 
and many other such issues. 
In the past, the protection against illicit drugs which are ‘severe and addictive’, was 
considered by this Court to be a legitimate purpose.158 In the present case, however, the use 
of cannabis must be treated differently than it has been in the past due to the following 
comprehensive scientific research, which clearly indicates that cannabis is no more ‘severe’ 
and ‘addictive’ than alcohol and tobacco, and which reveals that the State’s purpose may 
actually be to uphold antiquated reasoning which was originally based upon pseudo-
scientific research with racist motivations. It is acknowledged that any investigation into the 
health hazards of recreational drugs is unavoidably affected by social approval or 
disapproval, and conflicting views as to its potential legal status.159 Any court considering 
this issue would thus be urged to be wary of this. A court would also be asked to avoid 
treating cannabis as a “special” drug in its own category,160 but rather to evaluate it in the 
same manner as other recreational substances, namely alcohol and tobacco. The adverse 
effects of cannabis as compared to alcohol and tobacco will be (briefly) dealt with in terms 
of mental health, physical health and prevalence of risk in South Africa.   
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5.2.2 THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF CANNABIS ON MENTAL HEALTH COMPARED TO 
TOBACCO AND ALCOHOL 
 
Some of the possible adverse mental effects of cannabis include psychological 
responses (for example, panic, anxiety, depression or psychosis),161 effects on pre-existing 
mental illness,162 the chance of the development of mental illness (sometimes referred to as 
‘cannabis psychosis’),163 and the possibility of dependency and/or withdrawal effects.164 
Adverse mental effects of alcohol consumption include psychological responses (changes in 
emotions and personality), as well as impaired perception, learning and memory.165 There is 
a strong link between the use of alcohol and interpersonal aggression,166 and consumption 
may lead to dependency and/or withdrawal effects.167 Finally, although tobacco is not a 
psychoactive substance, it is undeniably dependence-producing and has been shown to 
affect the smoker’s mood patterns.168 It is therefore evident that all three substances lead 
to dependence and/or withdrawal, and therefore the ‘harm’ or ‘wrong’ which the State 
associates with cannabis due to its ‘addictive’ nature, is not associated with cannabis alone, 
but concerns alcohol and tobacco also. Furthermore, both alcohol and cannabis are 
considered ‘psychoactive’169 or ‘mind-altering’ substances, in that they lead to altered 
psychological behaviour.  
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The term ‘cannabis psychosis’ is often cited as an adverse and severe effect of 
cannabis, but there is evidence to support the contention that this term is often misused, 
misunderstood and falls foul of the common conflation in psychological studies, between 
the concepts of ‘correlation’ and ‘cause’170. The latter notion is important to understand in 
this context, because the mere fact that some psychological study subjects who suffer from 
psychosis happened to consume cannabis at some stage, does not per se mean that the 
psychosis was in fact caused by cannabis consumption.  Effectively the submission is that 
there is insufficient, or lack of proof to support the argument for a causal effect. 
People in South Africa have consumed, and do consume, alcohol to the extent that 
they lack the criminal capacity to act.171 As far as psychological behaviour is concerned, it 
can be argued that alcohol is more intoxicating than cannabis,172 yet alcohol is not 
prohibited by the Drugs Act. The comparative ‘wrongs’ or ‘harms’ of alcohol intoxication are 
controlled and regulated through state interventions such as prohibition of driving under 
the influence of alcohol173. This being so, the State arguably does not have a legitimate 
purpose in preventing a social ‘harm’ or ‘wrong’ regarding the potential mental and 
psychological effects of cannabis, whilst it fails to prevent the same harm regarding alcohol 
and tobacco. Legitimacy would require one of two things: either the State should prohibit 
the use of alcohol and tobacco, or it should not be permitted to prohibit cannabis. Evident 
from this part, is that the purpose of harm prevention regarding the mental effects of 
cannabis, cannot be legitimate whilst medical evidence proves that alcohol causes as much, 
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5.2.3 ADVERSE PHYSICAL EFFECTS OF CANNABIS COMPARED TO TOBACCO AND 
ALCOHOL 
 
Cannabis affects the brain receptors, and this potentially can cause dose-related 
impairments of psychomotor performance.174 When consumed through smoking long-term, 
cannabis is associated with increased symptoms of respiratory and cardiovascular diseases, 
similar to those associated with tobacco smoking.175 Finally, the abuse of cannabis can also 
have an adverse effect on foetal growth when a pregnant mother consumes it.176 Regarding 
alcohol consumption, chronic heavy drinking can have serious repercussions for the 
functioning of the entire nervous system, particularly the brain.177 These include, non-
exhaustively, atrophy of nerve cells and brain shrinkage, as well as Korsakoff’s Syndrome, 
described as: ‘a devastating memory disorder in which a person appears to forget incidents 
of his or her daily life as soon as they occur.’178  
Alcohol misuse contributes to chronic health problems such as liver failure and 
cirrhosis, and can contribute to a compromised immune system, increasing susceptibility to 
opportunistic diseases.179 Alcohol misuse during pregnancy has been linked to foetal alcohol 
syndrome in infants.180 Tobacco smoking causes tuberculosis, lower respiratory infections 
and various forms of cancer.181 Tobacco smoking also contributes to cardio-vascular 
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diseases.182 Morgan and Zimmer have stated the following regarding the myth of the link 
between lung disease and cannabis smoking: 
‘…marijuana and tobacco smoke are nearly identical.  Because most marijuana 
smokers inhale more deeply and hold the smoke in their lungs, more dangerous 
material may be consumed per cigarette. However, it is the total volume of irritant 
inhalation -- not the amount in each cigarette -- that matters. Most tobacco smokers 
consume more than 10 cigarettes per day and some consume 40 or more. Regular 
marijuana smokers seldom consume more than 3 -5 cigarettes per day and most 
consume far fewer. Thus, the amount of irritant material inhaled almost never 
approaches that of tobacco users. Frequent marijuana smokers experience adverse 
respiratory symptoms from smoking, including chronic cough, chronic phlegm, and 
wheezing. However, the only prospective clinical study shows no increased risk of 
crippling pulmonary disease (chronic bronchitis and emphysema).’183 
It is therefore evident that, regarding physical effects, the harmful effects of 
cannabis are again closely comparable to those of alcohol and tobacco in terms of foetal 
development, as well as the prevalence of respiratory and cardiovascular diseases 
(regarding tobacco use). While it is nearly impossible to rank the levels of harm caused by 
each substance in order of ‘seriousness’, it is submitted that a brief consideration of the 
prevalence of use of each of these substances provides a starting point. Based on empirical 
data, alcohol remains the most frequently reported primary substance of abuse across 
South Africa.184 This is illustrated by trauma and psychiatric data.185 Regarding mortality 
rates, the national figure of all non-natural deaths relating to blood-alcohol concentrations 
was a staggering 46% in 2002.186 Tobacco smoking is also highly prevalent, ranking third in 
                                                          
182 Ibid. 
183 Morgan J, Zimmer L ‘Exposing Marijuana Myths: A Review of the Scientific Evidence’  2005 originally 
published as monograph by The Lindesmith Center in New York City at pp 5-6. 
184 Central Drug Authority, 2006; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004. 
185 Parry et al, The South African Communtiy Epidemiology Network on Drug Use (SACENDU): Description, 
Findings (1997-99) and Policy Implications, Addiction Vol 97, 2002. 
186 Op cit note 179. 
66 
K KOWALSKI 
terms of mortality rates in South Africa.187 Cannabis, on the other hand has a very low acute 
toxicity, and as of 1998, there were no confirmed published cases worldwide of human 
deaths from cannabis poisoning.188 Regarding the addictive properties of cannabis, Morgan 
and Zimmer state that: 
‘It is now frequently stated that marijuana is profoundly addicting and that any 
increase in prevalence of use will lead inevitably to increases in addiction…for any 
drug to be identified as highly addictive, there should be evidence that substantial 
numbers of users repeatedly fail in their attempts to discontinue use and develop 
use patterns that interfere with other life activities… epidemiological surveys show 
that the large majority of people who have had experience with marijuana do not 
become regular users.’189 
I submit that the harm-causing properties of cannabis fall directly within the 
categories of self-harm tolerated by the State. This is so, because despite clear medical 
evidence which suggests that alcohol and tobacco are more prevalent causes of mortality 
and physical health problems, the State continues to permit the consumption of alcohol and 
tobacco. To continue to treat cannabis as a separate category of potential harm-causing 
substances, is arbitrary and is not predicated on a legitimate purpose. The only reasonable 
inference to be drawn from the State’s refusal to include cannabis in the same category as 
alcohol and tobacco, is that the State is attempting to protect the personal morality of a 
sector of society – something which has effectively never been stated as a purpose which 
the State itself considers to be legitimate in the Prince case.  
Drawing again on the part earlier in this chapter, dealing with the role of public 
opinion and contemporary ‘moralising’ in the court’s adjudicative function, it is evident that 
even if public opinion echoed this potential ‘morality’ argument, the court should be slow to 
afford any particular weight to this in its determination of the Harksen rationality test. 
Further to this, again reiterating the conclusions drawn from the earlier appraisal of the 
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history of cannabis prohibition, to prohibit cannabis use on moral grounds, or as a choice of 
public morality which the State makes, is merely to entrench a bias which itself stems from a 
past history of highly racialized and blatantly incorrect psychological analysis. Regarding the 
‘harm’ or ‘wrong’ which cannabis constitutes – prevention of which the State claims is a 
legitimate purpose – compared with the comparative harms of alcohol and tobacco, it is 
thus evident that if the State’s purpose in such harm prevention were to be truly legitimate, 
its prohibition would have to properly take cognisance of the equal harm caused by use of 
alcohol and tobacco. Simply put, the State cannot continue to deem cannabis a menace to 
physical and psychological health which warrants the extreme of a prohibition, while it 
allows consumption of equally harmful substances. Such ‘naked preference’ shown to users 
of alcohol and tobacco cannot and does not, exhibit a legitimate government purpose. 
5.2.4 THE NEED TO FULFIL THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW  
 
The Constitution enshrines the need for South African courts to consider 
international law in their adjudications.190 In addition, the Constitution also provides that 
international treaty laws only become binding internally on the Republic when they are 
transformed into statute through the processes of the National Assembly.191 The 
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government purpose to fulfil international obligations would only be legitimate if these 
obligations in fact extend to cannabis prohibition in contemporary international relations, if 
there would be repercussions for failing to prohibit cannabis, and if the international 
opinions on cannabis have in fact remained as they were when such obligations came into 
existence. It is submitted that the recent shift in international public opinion, means that 
while previously South Africa’s commitment to the international ‘War on Drugs,’ may have 
been considered a legitimate purpose, as of today it appears to be a hopeless attachment to 
the past.  
The government purpose of fulfilling international law obligations, is likely to be the 
stated objective which is most capable of being seen as legitimate – providing that to fail to 
adhere to these obligations would create serious repercussions for the government, should 
cannabis not be prohibited under South African law. It is therefore necessary to examine 
whether there is any manner in which the international instruments which purport to create 
an obligation on signatory states, may be construed such that states are not considered to 
be in violation of international law obligations, should they forgo their prohibitions of 
cannabis. I submit that, if there would be no repercussions, and if accordingly the 
international community would not construe cannabis decriminalisation as a violation of 
international law obligations, then there would be no legitimacy in the government claiming 
such obligations as a purpose for cannabis prohibition.  
Leinwand states the following regarding the international obligations to prohibit 
drugs generally, and cannabis specifically, as they stood in the 1970s: 
‘The international legal norms that do exist are embodied in international 
agreements and treaties. The sole obstacle to…legalization of marijuana is…the 1961 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, a multilateral treaty under the sponsorship of 
the United Nations…This Convention imposes rather strict obligations on the parties 
in reference to cannabis and presents a clear barrier to domestic legalization of the 
drug…under international law, the domestic legality of an action does not excuse the 
violation of a treaty obligation, and the action thus remains illegal under 
international law. The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was intended to embody 
in one treaty and under one central administration the vast array of international 
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agreements regarding narcotic drugs; Article 44 of the Convention specifies that as 
between the parties, the Convention specifies that as between the parties, the 
Convention supersedes all pre-existing drug treaties.’192 
He wrote his paper to examine how international obligations to prohibit drug use 
may be circumvented such that international law obligations would no longer be an obstacle 
to the United States legalising cannabis use, however for the purposes of this dissertation, 
his work will be useful in providing an overview of the provisions of the Single Convention 
which create the international law obligations to prohibit cannabis. It will then be necessary 
to examine how other states have decriminalised or legalised cannabis use, despite the 
purported international law obligations created by this treaty, in order to justify the position 
that these so-called international obligations do not in fact bind the signatory states in 
perpetuity regarding the status of cannabis. Even if states are bound, the position is still 
justified that, despite these obligations, other states have in fact chosen their own paths in 
this regard, and this and other such treaties can therefore not be used as an excuse as to 
why cannabis must still be prohibited in South Africa.  
Regarding the specific prohibition contained in the treaty, Leinwand states the 
following: 
‘The preamble to the treaty states that its purpose is to prevent "addiction to 
narcotic drugs"… It was generally assumed by the delegates that cannabis was a 
narcotic substance which was at least habit-forming, if not as addicting as morphine 
and heroin, and that it was a "stepping stone" to those other drugs…In short, 
cannabis was included in the treaty because it was thought to be a narcotic drug, the 
addiction to which the treaty was designed to prevent. There is no definition of 
"narcotic" in the treaty; drugs were assigned to one or more of four schedules, each 
with a different degree of control, depending upon how harmful each substance was 
considered to be. Article 4 of the Convention provides that the parties must take the 
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legislative and administrative action necessary to carry out the provisions of the 
treaty.’193 
At this stage it is useful to highlight the fact that the treaty places cannabis in a 
category separate from alcohol and tobacco, which are not classified as substances which 
states ought to prohibit. At the outset therefore, the treaty makes the very mistake which 
the previous part of this dissertation has already examined. The treaty itself displays an 
arbitrary preference in that it classes cannabis in the same position as drugs such as opium 
and other highly dangerous substances, and in this regard, Leinwand states that:  
‘Section (c) of this Article is perhaps the most important clause in the treaty. It 
specifies that the parties may not permit the production, export, import, 
distribution, or possession of the listed drugs, including cannabis, except for medical 
purposes…It is also relevant that cannabis is included in Schedule IV, the most 
serious class, because under Article 2 (5) a party may then take the action of 
prohibiting its use.’194 [Emphasis added] 
The treaty was established in 1961, far before the current medical and other 
empirical evidence (mentioned in the previous part of this dissertation) debunked the 
theory that cannabis is a drug of a similar class to more harmful ones like opium for 
instance.  
South Africa is a sovereign state, subject first and foremost to the Constitution, 
which is the supreme law of the Republic.195 Notwithstanding our international obligations, 
we thus have a primary duty to justify and debate prohibition, particularly given the fact 
that such international obligations were established long before current medical and other 
empirical evidence was available to refute the need for such obligations regarding cannabis. 
Simply put, international obligations change with the progress of opinions and behaviours of 
the states which adhere to them. To claim obligations, which are asynchronous with current 
empirical research and contemporary international states’ behaviours, as the purpose for 
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continuing prohibition of cannabis, is to indeed display ‘naked preference’ with 
unwarranted adherence to fixed principles. Such conduct is not rational, whether or not a 
treaty from 1961 purports to justify this. Nevertheless, Leinwand proposed some interesting 
and valid arguments as to why, despite the existence of this and other relevant treaties, 
there may not be irreversibly binding obligations placed on states to prohibit cannabis. It is 
submitted that if these were plausible arguments in the 1970s, they would be even more so 
today, after the effluxion of time and the change of international opinions on the cannabis 
issue (to be briefly canvassed later in this chapter). 
The first point Leinwand makes, is that there is little cohesion regarding the rules of 
the law of treaties and how they are to be applied: 
‘Whether [a state] is able to achieve its goal under the terms of the Single 
Convention itself or by resort to the general international law of treaties makes little 
difference in terms of legal effect; both methods are equally valid…The problem that 
arises in looking to general treaty law is the same as that faced in nearly every other 
branch of international law: the lack of a final, binding authority as to what the 
rules actually are. In the absence of such an authority, a consensus of respected 
opinion must serve as a substitute.’ [Emphasis added] 
This implies that when considering what the current obligations under international 
law are, recourse may be had to the current international opinion is on the relevant issue – 
in this case, cannabis prohibition.  Similarly, Lauterpacht in 1955 stipulated, regarding the 
law of treaties: ‘Apart from that general and unavoidable acceptance of the basic principle, 
Pacta sunt servanda, there is little agreement and there is much discord at almost every 
point.’196 Leinwand, regarding methods by which states could divest themselves of 
international law obligations, stated the following: 
‘To relieve itself of the obligations of the Single Convention regarding marijuana, it is 
submitted that [a state] could selectively denounce the treaty - i.e., denounce only 
the terms of the Convention relating to cannabis. The Convention contains a 
Denounciation Clause (Article 46), but that clause does not provide for selective 
                                                          




denunciation. To see if this is possible, therefore, the rules of general international 
treaty law in regard to the separability of treaty clauses must be examined… The 
modern trend of opinion regarding separability of treaty clauses with respect to 
actions taken to alter the treaty in some way, is that separability should be 
increasingly permitted.’197 
Thus Leinwand shows that there are mechanisms through which a state could relieve 
itself of such obligations with impunity. This in turn means that the only obligation which 
the State has, is a continually, and irrationally self-imposed one. Further to this, Leinwand 
suggests that these tests for denunciation and separability imply something, which by itself 
means that, should a state fail to prohibit cannabis, it would in fact not fail to fulfil its 
international law obligations under this treaty: 
‘Cannabis is just one drug covered by the Convention, and as such is a "particular 
subject matter" upon which the rest of the treaty does not depend for support. As 
each drug is a separate entity, the enforcement of the terms of the Convention 
concerning cannabis is not necessary for the performance of the other provisions of 
the treaty. Since the purpose of the Convention is the prevention of addiction to 
narcotic drugs, and cannabis is neither addictive nor a narcotic, the cannabis 
clauses are not essential to the stated purpose of the treaty.’198 [Emphasis added] 
If this is indeed the case, South Africa’s government cannot use international 
obligations as a legitimate purpose which justifies prohibiting cannabis. There would 
effectively be no breach of international law obligations, were cannabis to be permitted. 
This is because, by separating the requirements for fulfilment of the essential purpose of the 
treaty, from the requirement for fulfilment of what can be viewed as merely incidental 
aspects, a state can remain compliant. It can also take for itself the necessary self-
determinative powers to regulate substances which are not essential to fulfilling the treaty’s 
purpose, while still remaining within an adherent boundary.  Despite this, there remains 
another obvious indicator of the fact that to decriminalise cannabis, would not amount to 
any material breach of international law obligations which could cause repercussions for 
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South Africa on the international front. This is the role of international custom, or customary 
international law, in determining international obligations, even notwithstanding treaties.  
‘Customary international law (“CIL”) is one of two primary forms of international law, 
the other being the treaty. CIL is typically defined as a “customary practice of states 
followed from a sense of legal obligation”…Governments take care to comply with 
CIL, and often incorporate its norms into domestic statutes.  ’199 
International custom, when it is adopted by either a majority of states, or by those 
states with the larger balances of power on the international stage, in turn changes the 
obligations which states have.200 International custom, or customary international law, 
consists broadly of two components which must be satisfied before a change in state 
behaviour may be regarded as a change in customary international law: state practice and 
opinio juris.201 As provided in the Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru)202, state practice and 
opinio juris form the substance of customary international rules. It was further stipulated in 
the Right of Passage203 case that state practice, while it certainly refers to ‘general practice’, 
also allows for localised or regional practice ‘amongst a group of states or just two states in 
their relations inter se as well as for general customs binding upon the international 
community as a whole’.204 Basing my submission on this logic, there are key international 
states which have, de facto, abandoned their international law obligations to criminalise 
cannabis, and have not faced repercussions internationally.205 This being the case, it is 
arguable that the decriminalisation or legalisation of cannabis amongst the group of states 
which have adopted these policy changes regarding cannabis, has created a new rule of 
customary international law. This new rule (if it exists, as I submit it does), while perhaps not 
mandating other states to decriminalise cannabis, can definitely be said to remove the 
prohibition on states regarding decriminalisation or legalisation. 
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This being so, if South Africa were to remove the prohibition on cannabis, the change 
in international custom would be reason enough to expect that South Africa would also face 
no negative repercussions. It is submitted, based on the above argument, that several key 
states internationally have decriminalised or legalised cannabis use, and have benefitted 
from this change.206  Pacula says the following regarding the relative cost-benefit analysis of 
the impact of decriminalisation/legalisation of cannabis on the healthcare system in 
California: 
‘[The following concerns the] …evidence of the potential budgetary effect to the 
state of California of an increase in marijuana use associated with legalization for 
marijuana on health care costs.  Estimates are focused on scientifically established 
health harms for which data is readily available, including the number of dependent 
users, treatment costs, emergency room visits, and hospitalizations.   The exercise 
shows that the rise in health care expenditures associated with scientifically 
established health harms known to be associated with use are likely to be small 
relative to the expected revenue and cost-savings associated with reductions in 
criminal justice…’207 
Her working paper demonstrates that while there have been cost implications for 
the healthcare system in California, these have been outweighed by the revenue available 
to the State following the regulation of cannabis rather than its prohibition.208 
Comparatively, the costs of the criminal justice system have also been positively affected.209  
This section has therefore illustrated that the two assumed state purposes behind cannabis 
prohibition, cannot be viewed as legitimate when examined under the construction of the 
rationality analysis as tacitly accepted by Mosoneke in Law Society v Minister of 
Transport.210 
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5.3 THE RELATION BETWEEN THE MEANS USED TO ACHIEVE THE PURPOSES OF 
DIFFERENTIATION, AND THE PURPOSE– IS THERE A RATIONAL CONNECTION? 
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the legislative scheme which prohibits 
cannabis is the means the State uses to differentiate between users of cannabis, and users 
of alcohol and tobacco. Should a court find that the State’s assumed purposes discussed in 
this chapter are legitimate, the next step would be to test whether there is a logical relation 
between the purposes of the differentiation, and the means the State uses to differentiate. 
The means used to differentiate include at a minimum, the parts of the legislative scheme 
which prohibit cannabis, and the parts of the legislative scheme which attach criminal 
sanctions to the users of cannabis.211 
In this chapter, I have already discussed whether the purpose of the differentiation 
between cannabis users, and users of alcohol and tobacco, is legitimate. I proceeded to 
make my submissions in relation hereto. I submit further, that given the use of legislative 
prohibition to achieve the State’s assumed purposes, submissions regarding the legitimacy 
of these purposes would make reference to highly similar, if not the same, evidentiary 
analysis which must be used to evaluate whether the means used to achieve the purposes 
are rationally connected to achieving the purposes.  
The reason for this, is that when assessing whether the legislative prohibition is a 
means which connects rationally to the purpose, consideration must be given to the same 
jurisprudential theme that underlies whether the purpose itself is legitimate. The means 
used must logically relate to the purpose behind differentiating between use of cannabis, 
and use of alcohol and tobacco. Cannabis must be proved to cause greater harm to society 
than is caused by alcohol and tobacco, in order for the prohibition to rationally be 
connected to the purpose.212 The consideration which I shall discuss now is whether the 
other means used by the State to differentiate (harsher criminal sanctions imposed upon 
users of cannabis) is rationally connected to the purposes behind the differentiation. 
                                                          
211 Chapter 5 of this dissertation at 5.1 The Legislative Scheme Revisited. 
212 My submission on this subject is reflected above at 5.2 and 5.3. 
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The sanctions imposed by the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, for the use of cannabis, are undoubtedly harsher than 
those imposed by the legislation which regulates the use of alcohol and tobacco.213 The 
Criminal Law Amendment Act effectively prescribes minimum sentences of between 15 
years and life imprisonment for any offence listed in Parts I and II of Schedule 2 to the 
Criminal Procedure Act (which includes cannabis). Effectively, the user of cannabis who is 
caught by law enforcement officers with more than a certain amount of cannabis in his 
possession, is subject to the sanctions mentioned directly above. This may be contrasted to 
the Liquor Act and Tobacco Products Control Act, which Acts prescribe lesser sentences for 
persons contravening the regulatory framework regarding alcohol and tobacco.214   
Notwithstanding the court’s discretion to impose lesser sentences, the very fact of 
the harsher minimum sentences for users of cannabis makes the legislative scheme, in its 
                                                          
213 Schedule 2, Parts I and II of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 read with the Criminal Law Amendment 
Act 105 of 1997 s 51: 
51. (1) Notwithstanding any other law but subject to subsections (3) and (6) a High Court shall if it has 
convicted a person of an offence referred to in Part I of Schedule 2, sentence the person to imprisonment for 
life. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other law but subject to subsections (3) and (6) a regional court or a High Court 
shall— 
(a) if it has convicted a person of an offence referred to in Part II of Schedule 2, sentence the person in the 
case of—  
(i) a first offender. to imprisonment for a period not less than 15 years: 
(ii) a second offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not less than 20 years; and 
(iii) a third or subsequent offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not less than 25 years; 
… 
Provided that the maximum sentence that a regional court may impose in terms of this subsection shall not be 
more than five years longer than the minimum sentence that it may impose in terms of this subsection. 
(3)  (a) If any court referred to in subsection (1) or (2) is satisfied that substantial and compelling 
circumstances exist which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence than the sentence prescribed in those 
subsections it shall enter those circumstances on the record of the proceedings and may thereupon impose 
such lesser sentence. 
… 
214 Liquor Act 59 of 2003; Tobacco Products Control Amendment Act 12 of 1999. Both Acts prescribe fines for 




current form, an exceptionally harsh means to achieve the purposes behind the prohibition. 
Despite the harshness of the means used, the only question is whether the means are 
rationally connected to the purpose, or put differently, whether the means are capable of 
achieving the purpose.215 Under this analysis, it is not appropriate or acceptable for a court 
to enquire as to whether other means would be better suited.216 This would be a conflation 
of the rational connection test and the test in the section 36 limitations analysis which asks 
whether less restrictive means could be used to achieve the State’s purpose.  
In the present instance therefore, this part of the rationality test is restricted to 
assessing whether the State’s assumed purposes (of preventing greater harm to society and 
fulfilling international obligations) are capable of being achieved through the legislative 
prohibition and the commensurate sanctions imposed on users of cannabis. If the measures 
are not capable of achieving the State’s purposes, then there cannot be a rational 
connection between the prohibition and the purposes of the State.217  
The issue of whether the State’s purpose of preventing greater harm to society is 
capable of being achieved through prohibition, is one which can be addressed through 
reference to the current cannabis use statistics, but it is doubtful whether this is sufficient to 
prove that the means are not capable of achieving the State’s purpose. The mere evidence 
of cannabis use prevalence (despite the existence of harsh criminal sanctions) cannot, by 
itself, dismiss the legislative scheme as not being rationally connected to the purpose 
behind it. Indeed, it is not enough to suggest that the legislative scheme is not effective, 
what must be proved is that the legislative scheme, by design or in effect, is not at all 
capable of achieving the State’s purpose.218 Since this is not the case, whatever the 
statistical evidence may be, it would therefore be a fruitless exercise to conduct a thorough 
analysis of statistical data on cannabis use prevalence. The simple truth is that prohibition 
does have some success at preventing, or at least ceasing (however temporarily) use of 
cannabis. While it is true that there are definitely less restrictive means which could be used 
                                                          
215 Supra note 120 at paras 14-16. 
216 Supra note 120 at para 16. 
217 Supra note 120 at paras 14-16. 
218 Supra note 120 at paras 14-16. 
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(such as those used to regulate the use of alcohol and tobacco), this is not a matter which 
may be assessed under the rationality analysis.  
It is for this very reason that I stated earlier in this dissertation, in Chapter 4, that the 
best hope for success of the rationality argument under section 9 (1), would be to attempt 
to employ an extended version of the legitimate government purpose leg of the rationality 
test, and through this, to argue that the State has no legitimate purpose for differentiating 
between the use of cannabis, and the use of alcohol and tobacco. Because the scope of the 
rational connection leg of the test is so narrow and does not permit comparison between 
measures that would be less invasive, and the measures employed, this significantly limits 
the ability to succeed on the ground of the rational connection test, should the legitimate 
purpose leg of the challenge be unsuccessful. In short, failure at the legitimate purpose leg 
of the test (which is in itself equally as possible as success at that stage) would in all 
probability preclude success under the rationality enquiry altogether, at which point the 
litigant would be advised to proceed under the other rights not covered in the breadth of 
this dissertation, and under those rights, to address the proportionality aspects of this case 
under the section 36 limitations analysis.  
The next issue to be addressed, in Chapter 6, will be a consideration of the types of 
remedial action available to the court, should it decide in favour of the litigant who brings 
this challenge. Chapter 6 has been written under the assumption of a successful challenge 
under the section 9 (1) rationality analysis and it must be emphatically reiterated that the 
outcome of either success or failure of this challenge rests finally with the court assessing 
the matter. The section 9 (1) rationality analysis has, I submit, the best prospect of success 
before a court, provided the court is persuaded to apply the extended construction of the 
legitimate government purpose aspect of the test ( which was, I submit, impliedly accepted 
by Mosoneke DCJ in Law Society v Minister of Transport). This notwithstanding, there is a 
still a good chance that a court would decline to apply this extended construction of the 
rationality test and that the rationality analysis would fail at this stage. With this in mind I 
elected to write the Chapter 6 analysis of potential remedial action, as it would be written 





5.4 TABLE SHOWING STATES WHICH HAVE DECRIMINALISED OR LEGALISED CANNABIS 
USE: Accessed from New Health Guide ‘Where is Marijuana Legal?’ 2014 accessed from: 
http://www.newhealthguide.org/Where-Is-Marijuana-Legal.html accessed on: 2015-12-14. 
 
Country Possession Sale Transportation Cultivation Notes 
Argentina Illegal but 
decriminalized 
Illegal Illegal Illegal Cannabis is legal for personal 
use and that too in small 
quantities and to be 
consumed in private 
locations. Consuming 
publically is usually accepted 
in young adults. Similarly 
consumption for medical 
reasons is accepted in private 
locations but it is not 
legislated. All other aspects 
are illegal and punishable by 
law. 
  Australia Illegal but 
decriminalized in 
certain states 
      Personal use is 
decriminalized in small 
quantities in some states 
such as South Australia, 
Australian Capital Territory, 
Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory. 
Belgium Illegal but 
decriminalized 
Illegal Illegal Illegal but 
decriminalized 
for one female 
plant only 
In Belgium, consumption in 
home and possessing 
quantities up to 3 g or a 
certain female plant is 
tolerated though not legal in 
adults. 
Brazil Illegal; however 
mostly tolerated 
Illegal Illegal Illegal The possession for personal 
use entails given a warning, 
community education. Selling 
and transportation of larger 
amounts is considered as 
drug trafficking. 
Canada Illegal but legal for 
use in medicine and 
industries after 
obtaining a governed 
issued license. 
Illegal Illegal Illegal unless the 
plants are grown 
for medical 






Colombia Illegal but 
decriminalized 
      Since the year 1994, 
possession of small 
quantities of cannabis up to 
22 g has been decriminalized 
for personal use. 
Costa Rica Illegal but 
decriminalized 
      Though cannabis use is 
illegal, the tolerance of 
smoking marijuana is high in 
the entire country. 
Possession of small 
quantities for personal use 
has been decriminalized 
though no minimum amount 









Since April 1st2013, medical 
use or prescription is legal. 
Ecuador Illegal but 
decriminalized 
Illegal Illegal Illegal Possession of less than 10 g is 
considered as possessing for 
personal use and is legal but 
not punished. 
France Illegal but legal for 
medical use 
      Cultivating, selling, owning or 
consuming cannabis is 
prohibited. 
India Illegal/Legal(under 
the regulation of 
government) 
Illegal/Legal (It 






permission it is 
legal) 
It is utilized during the 
observance of some Hindu 
rituals. Though it is illegal to 
possess by law but the law is 
treated with low priority. 
Many states such as Tripura, 
West Bengal and North East 
has their own separate laws 
that allow cannabis which is 
locally known as ganja. Large 
tracts of marijuana grow 
unchecked in the wild parts 
of many states such as 
Tripura, West Bengal, Kerala 
etc. 
Iran   Regulated use 
is legal while 
unregulated 
use is illegal 




Legal It is legal to grow cannabis as 
the seeds of the plant are 
eaten by the locals. 
Moreover, companies draw 
oil from the seed, which is 
then sold legally. 
Mexico Illegal but 
decriminalized 
      Since August 2009, personal 
use and possession of up to 5 






Legal Legal Legal Legal The sale, growth and 
consumption of marijuana is 
legal and not regulated by 
the government of North 
Korea. 
Pakistan Illegal/Legal       Though laws exist inhibiting 
the sale and misuse of 
marijuana, still they are very 
rarely used. The use in 
community gatherings is 
tolerated considering it to be 
a centuries old custom. 
Moreover, in the wild, large 
tracts of marijuana grow 
unchecked. 
Switzerland Illegal but 
decriminalized 
Illegal Illegal but 
decriminalized 
Legal in certain 
Cantons 
Since January 2012, growing 
of cannabis of up to 4 plants 
is allowed in some cantons. 
United 
States 
Illegal at federal level 
but it is legal at state 
level in states such as 
Washington and 
Colorado. 
Illegal Illegal Illegal Laws concerning marijuana 
vary by state. 
Spain Illegal but 
decriminalized 
Illegal Illegal Legal Growing of plant for personal 
use is legal. 
Uruguay Legal for personal 
use 
Illegal Illegal Illegal It is legal for personal use so 













6. A ‘JUST AND EQUITABLE’ REMEDY 
6.1 DEFINING ‘JUST AND EQUITABLE’ REMEDIES THROUGH THE LENS OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
Section 172(1) of the Constitution219 grants the court wide remedial powers.  
Remedial action and the possibility of the court granting any at all, only arises as an issue 
following a declaration of invalidity by the court. Section 172(1) instructs the court to 
declare any law or conduct invalid, if it infringes any provision, or unjustifiably limits rights in 
the Constitution. This declaration of invalidity is not optional upon a finding of constitutional 
invalidity or infringement – the language of s 172(1) is peremptory, using the word ‘must’, 
not ‘may’ or ‘should’.220 While the court has no discretion in declaring law or conduct invalid 
where it is unconstitutional, the remedy it grants thereafter is within the court’s discretion. 
The proviso to which the court must adhere, is merely that the remedial action it orders, 
should be ‘just and equitable’.221 A ‘just and equitable’ remedy should, at first blush, be 
capable of facilitating or triggering redress to those asking for a remedy, but should also 
                                                          
219 Of the Republic of South Africa, 1996:  
S 172 
(1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court— 
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the 
extent of its inconsistency; and 
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including— 
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and 
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any conditions, to 
allow the competent authority to correct the defect. 
(2) … 
(b) A court which makes an order of constitutional invalidity may grant a temporary interdict or other 
temporary relief to a party, or may adjourn the proceedings, pending a decision of the Constitutional 
Court on the validity of that Act or conduct. 
… 
(d) Any person or organ of state with a sufficient interest may appeal, or apply, directly to the 
Constitutional Court to confirm or vary an order of constitutional invalidity by a court in terms of this 
subsection. 
220 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC). 
221 Constitution s 172(1). 
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preserve the carefully prescribed boundaries of the functions of the different arms of 
government. How this is achieved, depends largely on the court’s construction of the 
doctrine of the separation of powers, and the court’s adoption of an appropriate 
construction of judicial deference.  
6.1.1 SEPARATION OF POWERS REVISITED 
As previously discussed in Chapter 4, the separation of powers doctrine rightly 
comes into prominent focus when discussing potential remedial action by the court, 
particularly upon a finding of unconstitutionality. The issue, as argued in Chapter 4, only 
becomes contentious upon contemplation by the court of how to cure the unconstitutional 
law or conduct of its inconsistency with the Constitution. Until this point, the court, in 
deciding issues of rationality, and in declaring such irrational law or conduct invalid (which it 
is mandated to do by s 172(1)), is performing no role or function which is not explicitly 
reserved to it by the constitutional text. Per the reasoning in Obergefell222, Glenister223 and 
Doctors for Life224, when a court decides upon validity of law or conduct, it is performing 
exactly the role envisaged by the constitutional order, in that to do so is to uphold rights and 
perform an oversight function over the other arms of government. Deciding which remedial 
action is appropriate, is a different albeit connected matter, and one which requires a more 
nuanced appreciation of the role which the separation of powers plays at this juncture in a 
court’s deliberation. 
 Having submitted that the government’s prohibition of cannabis is not rational, and 
is not predicated upon a legitimate government objective (when compared to the 
government’s position on alcohol and tobacco), it is trite that a finding of this nature would 
therefore warrant a declaration of constitutional invalidity by the court, per section 172(1). 
What remains unclear however, is what remedial action would be most appropriate, having 
due regard to the nuanced effect of the separation of powers on this decision.  
                                                          
222 Supra note 80. 
223 Supra note 76. 
224 Supra note 78. 
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The most effective manner of addressing this question, is to delve into the discussion 
about judicial deference. Given that the court’s role is to devise remedial action for a 
successful litigant, the way the separation of powers manifests in judicial contemplation of 
remedial action, is through the court’s deliberation of how much it should defer to the 
legislative arm of government in the remedy it constructs. A remedy which substitutes the 
decision of a court for the legislature’s decision, will likely be too invasive, as it would not 
defer appropriately to the expertise and role of the law-making institution of a nation. On 
the other hand, a remedy which cannot offer proper vindication of rights for the successful 
litigant, would be a neglect of the court’s duty to provide satisfaction through its eventual 
decision regarding remedy.225 Where the court draws its line between these two extremes 
will depend on the culture of judicial deference which the court adopts in its deliberations. 
Only through the adoption of a proper and coherent theory of judicial deference, can the 
court ensure that the separation of powers is properly and sufficiently preserved. 
6.1.2 AN APPROPRIATE CONSTRUCTION OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE: A 
DIALOGIC APPROACH.  
Judge Dennis Davis penned an article (‘To defer and then when? Administrative law 
and constitutional democracy’) in which he addressed the issue of judicial deference with 
focus on the operation of deference within an administrative law context. It is submitted 
that his article contains an appropriate construction of judicial deference even in a rights 
litigation context, as the issues facing the court in administrative law contexts are highly 
similar to those experienced in a case like the one currently under consideration. Both 
contexts involve the need to remedy injustice caused by other branches of government, 
both involve (in some instances) considerations of remedy following a finding of irrationality 
and invalidity, and both involve the weighing up of the same concerns in devising ‘just and 
equitable’ remedies. Davis approvingly cites Hoexter’s definition of deference: ‘A  
willingness  to  appreciate  the  legitimate  and  constitutionally-ordained  province  of  
[government] agencies; to admit the expertise of those agencies in policy-laden or 
polycentric issues; to accord their interpretations of fact and law due respect and to be 
                                                          




sensitive in general to the interests legitimately pursued by [governmental] bodies and the 
practical and financial constraints under which they operate.’226  
A proper account of judicial deference is arguably one which is capable of 
constructing a dialogic relationship between the judiciary and the legislature, particularly in 
rights litigation cases. Our Constitution envisages interaction between the branches of 
government, and this interaction is described by Justice Ngcobo, as a constitutional dialogue 
between the arms of government.227 Courts are given the central role to uphold the 
Constitution and give life to its foundational values.228 It has the final word on whether an 
act of parliament is invalid or whether any exercise of public power was invalidly taken.229 
All branches of government must effectively work together to uphold and enforce the 
Constitution and its values, and constitutional dialogue is a firm response to criticism that 
the courts usurp the functions of democratically elected government, when they pronounce 
on otherwise ‘political’ issues. 230 The dialogic theory appreciates that judicial findings of 
invalidity are only the beginning of the process.231 The proper application of the idea of a 
constitutional dialogue is that there is dynamic interaction between the branches of 
government: when the court declares something invalid, this ought to be followed by 
amendment or other action by parliament or the executive.232   
The practical operation of this dialogic approach is found in the Constitution itself. As 
stated above, sections 8(3) and 172(1) provide that a court has the mandate to strike down 
or declare invalid any conduct or law which is inconsistent with the Constitution, and may 
also make any order that is just and equitable. These powers mean that the branches of 
government are drawn into a conversation whenever litigants believe the government has 
                                                          
226 DM Davis ‘To defer and then when? Administrative law and constitutional democracy’ (2006) Acta Juridica 
23-40 at pp25-27. 
227 S Ngcobo ‘South Africa’s Transformative Constitution: Towards an Appropriate Doctrine of Separation of 
Powers’ (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 1.  







acted contrary to the Constitution, and this conversation affords the court an appropriate 
lighter touch through the discretion it has to devise a ‘just and equitable’ remedy. An 
example of this is found in section 172(1)(b), which permits a court, upon a finding of 
invalidity, to make an order suspending the order of invalidity such that the offending 
branch of government may remedy the defect – the court may also grant the government 
extensions of these time periods if reasonable to do so.233 
Judicial deference, and the notion of constitutional dialogue, guard against the 
counter-majoritarian dilemma, particularly where the court is required to give a remedy to 
correct an unconstitutional law.234 This task runs the greatest risk of usurping the 
legislature’s law-making function, in light of counter-majoritarian arguments. The counter-
majoritarian argument holds that it is unacceptable for an unelected judicial bench to 
overrule the democratically elected legislature on governance matters.235 Governance 
matters would include how the legislature elects to regulate the affairs of society. The role 
of the court in declaring law or conduct invalid is unassailable, but this role does not extend 
to instructing the legislature on the best manner of correcting this defect where an entire 
legislative scheme is involved.  
The court has the right and duty to declare the legislative scheme unconstitutional, 
insofar as it applies to cannabis consumption. Cannabis prohibition is not rational when 
compared to the treatment of alcohol and tobacco, therefore it is necessary for the court to 
declare that this is so, and invalidate the legislative scheme for this reason. What is 
impermissible, is for the court to proceed to dictate to the legislature exactly the finer terms 
of how this is to be corrected. This is not a constitutional dialogue, as it leaves little room for 
the legislature to respond in a constructive manner. In this circumstance it would either 
have to comply, or be seen to ignore the court’s decision – both of which are equally 
unpalatable options.  
 






6.1.3 ‘JUST AND EQUITABLE’ – EFFECTIVENESS AND PRESERVATION. 
Arguably, a proper account of judicial deference will be one which best balances the 
need to vindicate fundamental rights (through recourse to an effective remedy) against the 
need to preserve the distinction between correcting unconstitutional law or conduct, and 
overstepping the boundary between arms of government. Just as the meaning of ‘just and 
equitable’, in the context of remedies, depends on a proper construction of judicial 
deference, so too does a proper account of judicial deference depend on the proper 
interpretation of ‘just and equitable’ in section 172(1). The Rule of Law requires that justice 
be delivered effectively to those who seek recourse to its structures and institutions, and 
accordingly, where there is infringement of rights by the conduct or decisions of relevant 
persons or bodies, effective remedies must be considered and dispensed by the court which 
finds that such infringements have occurred. The law acknowledges that where there is a 
right there is a remedy, and without an effective remedy that is of practical effect for the 
litigants, justice does not avail them in their cause and is for all intents and purposes, 
withheld.236  
The approach required to grant an effective, ‘just and equitable’ remedy can be 
illustrated with reference to the approach to remedies of the Constitutional Court in Fose v 
Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC): 
‘ An appropriate remedy must mean an effective remedy, for without effective 
remedies for breach, the values underlying and the right entrenched in the 
Constitution cannot properly be upheld or enhanced. Particularly in a country where 
so few have the means to enforce their rights through the courts, it is essential that 
on those occasions when the legal process does establish that an infringement of an 
entrenched right has occurred, it be effectively vindicated. The courts have a 
particular responsibility in this regard and are obliged to forge new tools and shape 
new remedies, if needs be, to achieve this goal’.237 [Emphasis added]. 
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Fose illustrates that a ‘just and equitable’ remedy must be robust enough to 
successfully, and sufficiently, vindicate the infringed right. The need to ‘forge new tools’ and 
‘shape new remedies’ illustrates further that the discretion vested in the court is intended 
to serve a particular purpose.238 This purpose must be to restore the litigant, as much as is 
reasonably possible, to the position he or she was in before the right was infringed.239 By 
way of example, if a person was a criminal before the court’s pronouncement, he or she 
must, at the very least, cease to be considered one in the eyes of the law, after the court has 
deemed that law unconstitutional. In this context, the equality provision would require that 
cannabis consumers not be treated as criminals where consumers of alcohol and tobacco 
are not. For this to be satisfied, the court’s remedy must be robust enough to ensure that 
this can indeed be so.  
On the other hand, a proper construction of judicial deference in the context of 
remedies must also consider that section 172(1) does not mean that the remedy can 
amount to a substitution of the court’s vision of governance for the legislature’s (the court 
cannot replace the legislature’s vision for its own where there are other ways of curing the 
defect). The legislature, and democracy, per Obergefell, are the primary engines for reform 
in the law, as it is the legislature which is democratically elected, and therefore carries a 
higher law-making pedigree. The implications of this for the interpretation of section 172(1), 
and for a proper account of judicial deference, include that highly invasive remedies (which 
amount to a usurpation of the legislature’s law-making power), ought not to be 
contemplated by the court. What constitutes ‘highly invasive’ will, it is submitted, depend 
on the circumstances of each case, and stands to be determined casuistically. The following 
parts of this dissertation will be dedicated, by way of a conclusion, to exploring several 
remedial options available to the court, and assessing exactly where to draw the line 
between a sufficiently robust remedy, and one which is too invasive. 
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6.2 INAPPROPRIATE REMEDIAL ACTION. 
6.2.1  ‘READING DOWN’: PREVENTION RATHER THAN CURE 
As stated previously in this dissertation, ‘reading down’ is not so much a 
constitutional remedy as it is a preventative measure. Reading down the language of a 
statute so as to bring about compliance with the Constitution prevents any declaration of 
invalidity, in accordance with the principle of avoidance.240 This principle aims to prevent a 
statute from being declared unconstitutional, by reading the language of the statute in a 
manner which saves it from invalidity, but still accords with the legislature’s purpose behind 
the enactment of the offending legislation. Per Justice O’Regan:  
‘What may be the ordinary meaning of the statutory provision is restricted to avoid 
an unconstitutional consequence. Reading down a statute does not require any 
order or remedy; it is something that is done in the text of the judgment itself with 
no consequential relief to follow.’241 
It is submitted that in the present case, reading down is wholly inappropriate. As 
stated earlier in this chapter, the unavoidable outcome would certainly need to be a 
declaration of invalidity of the legislative framework insofar as it concerns cannabis. This is 
so for reasons which are evident from the principles involved in reading down a statute, 
outlined equably by Justice O’Regan: 
‘One of the questions that arises is how far a court should go to find a meaning 
consistent with the Constitution in the face of the express language in the provision 
itself. In South Africa, two principles are in tension here: the desirability of avoiding a 
declaration of invalidity which, is at least at one level, an affront to the legislature 
who enacted it and therefore a result that courts, for reasons of institutional comity 
and respect, prefer to avoid; the other is the rule of law principle that legislation 
should be clear and intelligible upon its face. Attaching a meaning to the words in a 
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241 K O’Regan ‘Fashioning constitutional remedies in South Africa: some reflections’ 2011 Middle Temple and SA 
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legislative provision that is different to the ordinary import of the words may well 
impair this principle.’242 
In the present instance, reading down the language of the Schedules of the Drugs 
and Drug Trafficking Act so as to interpret the legislative scheme as non-inclusive of 
cannabis, would be in flagrant contradiction of the legislature’s obvious intention in this 
regard. By including cannabis in the schedules to this Act, and other component Acts of the 
legislative scheme, the legislature’s clear intention is to prohibit cannabis. Any attempt to 
read the schedules as a non-prohibition of cannabis would, therefore, constitute a higher 
affront to the legislature than would a declaration of invalidity, properly suspended (to be 
discussed in further detail later in this chapter). 
 As stated above, it is simply not possible to preserve the intention behind the 
statutes whilst attempting to construe a prohibition as anything other than a prohibition. 
Any attempt to read down the schedules to this and other component Acts within the 
legislative scheme as excluding cannabis, would be such an attempt, and would overstep 
the clear boundaries set for the court when performing such an interpretative exercise. 
Whilst a declaration of invalidity is an ‘affront to the legislature’243 it is at least one which 
the court is directed to make by the Constitution section 172(1), one which is contemplated 
by the Constitutional framework, and one which the court may make, without stretching to 
the very limits the bounds of statutory interpretation. 
6.2.2 SEVERANCE: A SEVERE ENCROACHMENT 
Severance is one example of a remedy employed by the court once it has granted a 
declaration of invalidity. It is necessary at this point to recall the principles and procedures 
incumbent upon such a declaration. Per Justice O’Regan: 
‘Once a court has concluded that a statutory provision is inconsistent with the 
Constitution, section 172 states that it must declare the provision inconsistent. The 
court does, however, have a range of choices as to the precise terms of the 
declaration of constitutional invalidity and any ancillary relief. The two obvious 
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decisions for a court are: the scope of the order of invalidity; and the effective date 
of the order of invalidity: should it come into operation immediately with 
prospective effect only, should it have retrospective effect, or should it be 
suspended for a period to give the relevant authorities time to correct the 
constitutional problem.’244 
As will be submitted later in this chapter, a suspension of the order of invalidity
 would be the most appropriate remedy in the present case, as it is through this 
remedy that the court may vindicate the rights infringed by the legislative scheme (by 
declaring it unconstitutional) whilst still preserving an appropriate level of judicial deference 
to the legislative arm of government. This being so, severance as a remedy is not one which 
is capable of preserving appropriate judicial deference, given the test that is used to 
determine whether severance can be employed as a remedy. On this issue, O’Regan states 
the following: 
‘Severance involves either excising words or provisions from a statute so as to 
remove the cause of constitutional complaint (actual severance); or notional 
severance that provides that a particular meaning or effect of a legislative provision 
is deemed to be ‘notionally severed’ from the ambit of the provision. Actual 
severance is a useful jurisprudential technique that allows courts to target the 
offending words in a provision and sever them and has been used on numerous 
occasions by the Constitutional Court to eradicate unconstitutional provisions (or 
parts of them) from statutes. Severance can sometimes be quite extensive. The test 
for severance is the simple test whether the ‘bad can be severed from the good’ in 
such a manner that what remains is still consistent with the legislative purpose.’245 
The legislative purpose behind cannabis prohibition has already been discussed at 
length in Chapters 4 and 5. It is evident that the purpose of the legislative scheme, regarding 
cannabis, is to prohibit. The government itself claims that such a purpose is legitimate in 
defence of the legislative scheme in Prince, and would likely do so again in a future 
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challenge. The question which arises then, per the test for severance employed by the 
court, is this: can cannabis be severed from the relevant schedules whilst still upholding the 
purpose of the legislation? I would submit that the answer is one of two things: either this is 
not possible without eroding the State’s purpose behind including cannabis in the 
schedules, or it is possible, but not without a severe incursion into the territory of the 
legislature and an insufficiently deferential approach toward the separation of powers. The 
government has a prerogative to regulate substances as it wishes, this much is true. The 
government does not however, have the right to prohibit substances when such prohibition 
is not rationally connected to a legitimate government purpose, and this is the justification 
for a declaration of invalidity.  
This notwithstanding, I submit that the court does not have the right to trespass so 
far into the territory of the legislature as to employ severance in a case of this nature when 
it comes to remedy. The court upholds rights in such cases by declaring the unconstitutional 
law or conduct invalid, but I submit that it ought not to go further and decide how this 
defect is to be corrected, particularly when to sever the defect would lead to an 
unmanageable state of affairs for the government. To simply excise cannabis from the 
schedules would create a legal vacuum of sorts, whereby there would be no regulation of 
cannabis whatsoever – this in turn would simply exacerbate the problems which would be 
better curbed through regulation (such as law enforcement, budget and regulatory 
logistics). The choice of how to cure the defect – through regulation rather than prohibition 
– ought rightly to lie with the legislature, and for a court to employ the remedy of severance 
would remove this choice from the realm of the legislature in an undesirably undemocratic 
manner. As Van Staden stipulates, regarding typical remedies employed by the court: 
‘A declaration of invalidity to the extent of the inconsistency is the default remedy 
following a finding of inconsistency and will only be departed from if a more limited 
order (such as reading in, notional or actual severance, suspending or limiting the 
retrospective effect of the order, or a combination of these) will provide a better 
outcome.’246 
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Where a court issues a declaration of invalidity to protect rights, but ought to tread 
lightly on the terrain of the legislature, it is possible to suspend the order of invalidity 
subject to notional or temporary severance of the offending parts of that legislation in order 
to cure the worst rights violations resulting therefrom, while the legislature is afforded an 
opportunity to correct the defect.247 On this subject, Van Staden notes that Bishop posits 
the following: 
‘…When a court awards this hybrid remedy it has already concluded that reading in, 
notional or actual severance is an inappropriate permanent measure but requires a 
“stop-gap measure” until the legislature gets around to deciding how to cure the 
defect.’248 
In this regard severance could be usefully employed to cure the defect created by 
including cannabis in the legislative scheme’s prohibition of dangerous dependence 
producing substances. I submit however, that this would open the door to the same 
problem posed by severance as the sole remedy, and not just as a ‘stop-gap’ measure. The 
problem is that to simply sever a substance which has been prohibited, from the legislative 
scheme, and it being a substance around which there is absolutely no regulatory framework, 
without further qualification or structural oversight, would be to create a lacuna in the law 
enforcement sector. This would be impossible to regulate at a later stage without serious 
budgetary and logistical implications.   
6.3 STRIKING AN APPROPRIATE BALANCE: SUSPENSION OF THE ORDER OF 
INVALIDITY AND THE NEED FOR A STRUCTURAL INTERDICT 
This chapter has briefly discussed certain preventative and remedial action open to 
the court when faced with a challenge to conduct or law under the Bill of Rights, and when 
declaring the law or conduct unconstitutional and invalid to the extent of the inconsistency. 
In this chapter, a discussion was conducted briefly regarding the reasons for the 
unsuitability of these actions referred to. Reference was made to the possible effective use 
of a declaration of invalidity, coupled with suspension of the order of invalidity, and use of 
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supervisory relief, also known as a structural interdict, to cure the defect in the legislation. 
Reference was also made to the need to preserve the Separation of Powers, through 
employment of an appropriate level of judicial deference. Section 172(1) of the Constitution 
instructs the Court, when it determines that law or conduct is inconsistent with the 
Constitution, to declare such law or conduct invalid to extent of the inconsistency.249 The 
one remedy which cannot be used at the Court’s discretion, is the declaration of invalidity. A 
court must declare unconstitutional law or conduct invalid. The manner of curing the defect 
is at the discretion of court.  
I submit that the way in which a court can best preserve an appropriate level of 
judicial deference in cases such as this one, is to declare the offending legislation invalid and 
to suspend the order of invalidity to allow Parliament to correct the invalid law through 
means of its own choosing, subject to supervision by the Court. This is because the task of 
rectifying the legislation which prohibits cannabis is not one which will be imposed on the 
Court, but will be imposed on the Legislature. As such, the Court cannot correct the defect 
of its own will and in the manner it prescribes, without placing an onerous burden on the 
legislature.  
The court may dictate what law is unacceptable in an egalitarian society based on 
the values of dignity, equality and freedom250, and may dictate that such law may no longer 
be upheld. The court however, may not always stipulate the manner of achieving legislative 
conformity with the Bill of Rights, without Court placing itself firmly in the terrain of the 
Legislature, which has the power and function under the Constitution to make law and to 
regulate the conduct of South African society. This is not permissible under the Separation 
of Powers, and as such, the correct remedy ought to include the deferral to the Legislature, 
of the manner in which the constitutional inconsistency is to be cured.  
This is only truly capable of achievement through a suspension of the order of 
invalidity by the Court, because the legislature is best placed to make polycentric decisions 
which involve considerations of both a logistic and budgetary nature, and which require 
further information than may be provided on the papers of such an application before the 
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court.251 This being so, a Court may nevertheless impose conditions on such a suspension, 
and may even order suspension either in part or in full depending on the circumstances of 
each case.252 The manner of imposing conditions may include supervisory orders and 
mandatory relief.253 The degree and content of these orders in turn also depends upon the 
overriding consideration when ordering remedial action: the need for the remedy to be just 
and equitable in the circumstances.  
Roach and Budlender have examined this species of relief in detail. At the opening of 
their paper, they state the following regarding this kind of remedial action: 
‘In Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign [(2002) (5) SA 721 (CC)]… the 
Constitutional Court indicated that 'a mandamus and the exercise of supervisory 
jurisdiction' may be necessary to ensure an effective remedy for a breach of any 
constitutional right, including a socio-economic right A year later, the Supreme Court 
of Canada held in Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education) that a trial 
judge could, after ordering that a government build minority-language schools, 
retain jurisdiction over the case and require the government to report back to the 
judge with affidavits on its progress in complying with the order.’254 
In both South Africa and Canada therefore, Courts have demonstrated that 
supervisory relief is sometimes necessary when curing invalid law or conduct. What this also 
illustrates, is that this type of relief is most effective in the arena of complex, polycentric 
decision-making, such as the regulation of the conduct of society in regard to education and 
in this case, substance consumption. It has also been used most effectively in the arena of 
socio-economic rights disputes.255 Most recently, the court has made use of the supervisory 
order in the case of Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief 
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Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency and Others (No 2) 2014 (6) BCLR 
641 (CC). After hearing argument on appropriate remedial action, the court said the 
following: 
‘Logic, general legal principle, the Constitution, and the binding authority of this 
Court all point to a default position that requires the consequences of invalidity to be 
corrected or reversed where they can no longer be prevented.  It is an approach that 
accords with the rule of law and principle of legality.’256 
The Court continued: 
‘Once a finding of invalidity . . . is made, the affected decision or conduct must be 
declared unlawful and a just and equitable order must be made.  It is at this stage 
that the possible inevitability of a similar outcome, if the decision is retaken, may be 
one of the factors that will have to be considered.’257 
Although the Court in these excerpts discussed remedy in the context of invalid 
administrative action, the same principles hold true for any polycentric issue. It holds true 
for socio-economic rights decisions, as evidenced by the decisions in TAC and Grootboom, 
and it similarly holds true in cases where social and political rights are at issue. This is 
evidenced by the approach of the court in the case of Minister of Home Affairs and Another 
v Fourie and Another 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC). The judgment of Sachs J gives insight into how 
the court has injected advisory paragraphs into its remedial orders, even when suspending 
the order of invalidity to give the legislature complete independence its decisions of how to 
cure the defect: 
‘… in exercising its legislative discretion Parliament will have to bear in mind that the 
objective of the new measure must be to promote human dignity, the achievement 
of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms… The second 
guiding consideration is that Parliament be sensitive to the need to avoid a remedy 
that on the face of it would provide equal protection, but would do so in a manner 
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that in its context and application would be calculated to reproduce new forms of 
marginalisation…’258 
Despite the fact that Sachs J concludes that supervisory relief would not be 
appropriate in the context of same-sex marriages259, I submit that in the context of the 
current issue, the Court would be faced with a markedly different context. The prohibition 
of cannabis use does not merely impact on the dignity and status in law of cannabis users, in 
the manner that the lack of marriage equality impacted on same-sex couples. Same-sex 
couples were not in a position where their choices, although unjustly not provided for and 
protected by law, resulted in deprivation of their liberty and freedom of movement. 
Cannabis users, under the prohibition, are liable to be sentenced to heavy fines and 
imprisonment.260 The remedy which the court constructs, ought therefore to take into 
consideration the harsh nature of the consequences of a lack of supervisory relief. Should 
the court merely suspend the order of invalidity with no recourse to supervisory or 
structural relief, the worst of the right’s violations resulting from the unconstitutional 
prohibition would not cease, and the relief granted would be ineffective.  
To illustrate the need for supervisory relief in instances where there is an urgent 
need to prevent further violations of rights, Roach and Budlender discuss the Constitutional 
Court’s decision in TAC, and note the Court’s reasoning at para 129 that: 
‘… a structural interdict should be granted where 'it is necessary to secure compliance 
with a court order'261 
The Constitutional Court has also stipulated that: 
‘A supervisory order will also be appropriate where the facts indicate that it is 
'inadvisable for the court to assume' that the order will be carried out promptly.’262 
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In the present case it is not difficult to imagine that an order declaring the 
prohibition of cannabis invalid would be slow in being rectified by the legislature, and not 
unjustifiably so. There would be a plethora of considerations of logistic and budgetary 
nature, to which Parliament would need to apply its mind, before a final correction to the 
offending legislative regime could be effected. This notwithstanding, it could not be 
justifiable to permit the continuation of criminal sanctions being imposed on users of 
cannabis. The only manner in which the court could effectively account for these realities 
would be to suspend the order of invalidity, but to order structural relief at least insofar as 
the imposition of criminal sanctions is concerned. This is illustrated by Roach and Budlender: 
‘A second circumstance in which a structural interdict is warranted is where the 
consequences of even a good-faith failure to comply with a court order are so 
serious that the court should be at pains to ensure effective compliance… The 
consequences of non-compliance are irremediable, and so serious that it is 
necessary to go beyond the mandatory order and do whatever is reasonably possible 
to ensure effective compliance. ’263 
The imposition of prison time and heavy fines are arguably ‘irremediable’, and 
therefore the court’s remedy should be supervisory to the extent that it precludes the 
further imposition of such sentences and fines from the date of the court’s order. The 
Court’s order in fact need do no more than to ensure the freedom of cannabis users until 
and including such time as the government devises its own plan to cure the offending 
legislative regime. This is actually more beneficial to both cannabis users and the State, as it 
prevents the worst of the violations of the rights of cannabis users, and allows the State the 
time and space it requires to formulate a permanent plan: 
‘The court can make an order which is as non-intrusive as possible on the choices 
which the elected government makes, because it can be secure in the knowledge that 
this will not be an invitation to non-compliance but rather an invitation to the 
government to formulate a plan in order to achieve compliance with the 
Constitution… there are interesting parallels between the ability to suspend 
declarations of invalidity (which is recognized in s 172 of the South African 
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Constitution) and the use of structural interdicts. In both cases courts are concerned 
about providing government some flexibility in order to select the precise means to 
achieve compliance with the Constitution, while also ensuring that compliance is 
indeed achieved within a finite and reasonable period of time.’264 
Roach and Budlender pay particular attention to the manner in which the 
Constitutional Court cured the defect of an Ordinance in the case of Zondi v MEC for 
Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 (4) BCLR 347 (CC): 
‘… [t]he court found that neither reading-in nor severance would be an appropriate 
remedy. The only appropriate remedy was to strike down the offending provisions, 
which were an integral part of the scheme of the Ordinance. The question was what 
should happen in the interim, while the legislature was attending to the matter. On 
the one hand, the infringement of constitutional rights could not be allowed to 
continue… On the other hand, there was a need to protect landowners against 
trespassing animals. The solution arrived at by the court was to declare the relevant 
sections of the Ordinance invalid, to suspend the order of invalidity for a period of 
twelve months, and to provide that pending the enactment of remedial legislation 
the Ordinance was to be applied in a specified manner...’265 
The upshot of this chapter therefore, is that it has been shown through reference to 
academic works as well as the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, that the most 
effective relief a court could grant in the present case would be a suspension of the order of 
invalidity coupled with supervisory or structural relief. This structural relief would only need 
to prevent continuation of the worst aspects of the prohibition of cannabis use, namely the 
imposition of criminal sanctions on cannabis users. The legislature would retain the 
discretion, subject to court supervision, regarding the manner of curing the defect in the 
legislative scheme. This would fulfil the requirement in section 172(1) of the Constitution – 
that the court grant a ‘just and equitable’ remedy. It would be ‘just’, because the court 
would effectively provide justice to the victims of the legislative scheme, by ceasing the 
worst of the right’s violations through necessary supervisory relief. It would also be 
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‘equitable’ because in suspending the order of invalidity for an appropriate period 
(dependent upon the circumstances), the court would leave the polycentric aspect of curing 
the legislative scheme to the legislature – the institution constitutionally mandated to 
create and modify the law.  
7. CONCLUSION: 
The case of Prince266 was the first in South Africa to bring before the court the 
question of the status of cannabis use and consumption. As has been shown, this case 
demonstrated the court’s unwillingness to consider the decriminalization of cannabis for a 
small section of the population, and the failure of the litigants to successfully challenge the 
applicable legislative scheme under the auspices of the right to freedom of religion. This 
dissertation’s title (Decriminalisation of Cannabis: High Time to Revisit Prince) equably 
described the focus of this study. This dissertation canvassed a challenge to the legislative 
scheme which prohibits cannabis in South Africa.  
The dissertation addressed some of the necessary component parts of an argument 
which could be brought before a court in an attempt to achieve a declaration of invalidity of 
the legislative scheme insofar as it refers to cannabis, with the ultimate goal being 
decriminalization of cannabis for personal use and consumption. This dissertation, rather 
than being a study on the policies of, and comparative benefits to, nations which have 
already taken steps to decriminalize or legalize cannabis, has comprised a snapshot of the 
minimum necessary contents of an argument which would have a reasonable prospect of 
success were it to be brought before a court with the necessary jurisdiction to pronounce on 
such a constitutional issue. 
In Chapter 1, the introductory chapter, I set out the differences between 
decriminalization and legalization of cannabis, and briefly outlined the reasoning behind the 
need to first achieve decriminalization before any attempt at full legalization may be made. I 
also canvassed the history of cannabis prohibition in South Africa, in order to lay a 
contextual foundation for the ultimate challenge to the legislative scheme, based on certain 
rights in the Bill of Rights. It became evident from this chapter that the government purpose 
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behind prohibition of cannabis, stems from a bad history of racist influences amongst other 
tainted legal, psychological and anthropological research. It further became evident, that 
the success of the potential challenge will depend largely on the incorporation of this 
contextual study into the matrix of Constitutional argument based largely on contemporary 
studies of the comparative effects of cannabis, alcohol and tobacco, measured against the 
constitutional standards provided by the Bill of Rights. 
In Chapter 2, I conducted analysis of the original Prince case. This analysis included a 
consideration of the challenge mounted by Prince and others against the legislative scheme 
which prohibits cannabis. In this analysis, I assessed the merits and failures of Prince’s case, 
based on the reasoning of majority and minority judgments of the Constitutional Court in 
the matter. Further to this, I attempted to distinguish the original challenge from the one 
under discussion in this dissertation, and it is now clear that the challenge envisaged in this 
dissertation has a greater prospect of success before a court than did the challenge 
mounted by Prince.  
In Chapter 3, I have address several underlying concepts which are brought to bear 
in the judicial mind when any human rights challenge is contemplated by a court. At a 
minimum these include: the necessary distinction between a challenge under s 8 of the 
Constitution (dealing with the direct application of the Bill of Rights), and one brought under 
s 39 of the Constitution (which involves an indirect application of the Bill of Rights); The role 
of international law in rights adjudication and the corollary need to consider international 
law; The role of foreign law in rights adjudication, and the accompanying danger of reliance 
on foreign law where the jurisdictions are vastly different; Considerations of public opinion 
and the separation of powers (with its ancillary consideration of judicial deference).  
These concerns must be addressed in order to better frame any challenge of this 
nature, for in any number of judgments given by South African courts in rights litigation, 
these concerns pervade the language of judgments and often sway the course of a 
judgment when properly considered and applied.  This chapter also served to elucidate the 
reasons why, for the purposes of this dissertation, it was unnecessary and beyond its scope 
to consider all the rights under which a challenge to the legislative scheme may be 
mounted. This chapter outlined the reasoning behind the decision to focus exclusively on 
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the right to equality, and specifically on the requirement of rationality contained in s 9 (1) of 
the Constitution.  
In Chapter 4, the right to equality was examined in close detail. More particularly, 
this chapter addressed an argument based on a broader account of the requirement of 
rationality in section 9(1) of the Constitution, and attempted to show two things in this 
regard: Firstly, under a broader account of rationality, a court must not only consider the 
stated purposes provided by the State (in an attempt to prove that a purpose behind 
differentiation between classes of persons is legitimate), but must consider the objective 
evidence which relates to these purposes, and make its evaluation of legitimacy accordingly;  
Secondly, a consideration of recent case law proved that this broader construction of 
the rationality analysis under section 9(1), is in fact already contemplated by the 
Constitutional Court, or even if it is not, it nonetheless has not been ousted by the same 
court in its reasoning. This chapter also set up the necessary comparators required to apply 
this construction of the rationality analysis, namely alcohol and tobacco. The State 
differentiates between cannabis users, and users of tobacco and alcohol, and it is therefore 
impossible to judge rationality of the differentiation without due recourse to a comparative 
framework between these three substances, which is evident from this chapter. 
In Chapter 5, the rationality analysis was applied. This was done by addressing the 
government’s stated purposes behind the differentiation between cannabis on the one 
hand, and alcohol and tobacco on the other hand. These purposes were then tested against 
objective contemporary evidence, legal argument and research, based on modern data and 
international law discussion. The conclusions reached in Chapter 1 were reconsidered and 
interwoven with the other evidence which militates against the legitimacy of the 
government’s stated objectives.  
In Chapter 6, a brief consideration of possible remedial action was put forward. This 
was necessary, as it has been demonstrated that, owing to considerations of judicial 
deference associated with the separation of powers, a litigant may well succeed on the 
merits of his case, yet still fail at the stage of remedial action. A fine line is required to be 
drawn between vindicating rights, and affording sufficient respect to the boundaries of the 
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judicial function. To this end, a number of select and most-oft employed remedies were 
examined briefly. A determination was reached that the remedy most capable of 
maintaining the delicate balance between the court’s role as the arbiter and guardian of the 
Constitution, and the need to afford due deference to the legislative arm of government, 
would be one of a declaration of constitutional invalidity of the legislative scheme insofar as 
it relates to cannabis, coupled with the necessary restrictions and qualifications. Such 
restrictions involve a suspension of the order of invalidity for a designated period, coupled 
with the necessary interim relief. This interim relief would ideally consist of a structural 
interdict by the court, which would also be subject to amendment on application where 
reasonably necessary.  
Ultimately, the matter of whether a potential challenge to the prohibition of 
cannabis would be a success or a failure, is one which lies solely at the discretion of the 
court which eventually hears the matter. Whilst the outcome may be uncertain, this 
dissertation has at least proposed some arguments which may persuade a court of the need 
to re-address the cannabis prohibition, and I submit further that a challenge to the 
prohibitive legislative scheme cannot be far away. My argument may not be one which is 
guaranteed success, but very few arguments of this nature ever can truly be guaranteed to 
secure a victory for a litigant. What I hope this dissertation has proved however, is that 
there is at least one plausible argument to be made for the decriminalization of cannabis, 
and that whatever the eventual outcome, this has proved that it is indeed high time to 
revisit the case of Prince, and so many thousands of other South Africans who share his 
predicament. 
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